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1. Introduction

Bankruptcy laws are not designed to redress racial wrongs. Indeed,
individuals were entitled to debt relief long before this country enacted laws
designed to provide relief from racial discrimination. Because bankruptcy laws
provide a complex set of remedies to financially distressed individuals and
appear to be race neutral, it is not surprising that they have never been
examined through a racial lens even though blacks and Hispanics appear more
likely to file for bankruptcy than whites. 1 A critical examination of bankruptcy
laws suggests that, in designing the type of relief to make available to potential
debtors, Congress either consciously or unconsciously exhibited a bias in favor
of a specific demographic profile. 2 Specifically, to benefit the most from
bankruptcy laws, the "Ideal Debtor" should be a married, employed homeowner
who (1) is the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust or has a large employerprovided retirement account; (2) has high, but reasonable, living expenses;
(3) provides financial support only to legal dependents; and (4) has little (or no)
student loan, alimony, or child support debt. Because statistical data suggest
that white people are more likely to fit the Ideal Debtor profile, race matters in
bankruptcy.
Part I of this Article discusses the goals and structure of bankruptcy relief
and explains that debtors generally have the right either to discharge some
debts, repay few debts, and keep certain specified property in a Chapter 7
proceeding, or to discharge more debts, repay some debts, and keep
considerably more property in a Chapter 13 proceeding. By permitting debtors
to keep tangible property, but not income, the federal Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code") 3 systematically favors debtors with wealth. Part ll of the Article
1. See TERESA A. SUWVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
234 (2000) (showing a greater percentage of minority homeowners in bankruptcy in 1999)..
2.
See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 19-20 (1992) (commenting that racism "goes beyond prejudice and discrimination,
and even transcends bigotry, largely because it arises from outlooks and assumptions of which
we are largely unaware"); Charles R. Lawrence m, The /d, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987)(suggesting that "[t]o
the extent that [a] cultural belief system (influenced by race) has influenced all of us, we are all
racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.").
3. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
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presents the demographic features of the individual most likely to benefit from
a bankruptcy discharge, that is, the Ideal Debtor, contrasts those characteristics
with the demographics of potential minority debtors, and concludes that the
Ideal Debtor is likely to be white. Part ill argues that, given the Code's existing
bias in favor of white debtors, Congress should refrain from enacting any
legislative proposal that exacerbates the disparity between the type of relief a
typical minority debtor and the Ideal (white) Debtor likely receives in
bankruptcy, that is, the "benefits gap." This Part concludes by urging Congress
to revise the Code to remove racially-biased provisions (like those that favor
individuals with wealth and favor homeowners over renters) and urges courts to
interpret vague terms in the Code in a pluralistic fashion that helps close (not
widen) the benefits gap.
II. Bankruptcy Relief

A. Goals
Bankruptcy proceedings are designed to give poor but honest debtors a
fresh financial start and to ensure that creditors are treated fairly in an orderly
debt resolution proceeding. 4 Financially-strapped people who seek bankruptcy
relief have two main options and, unless there are allegations of fraud or abuse,
can largely choose which option they prefer. The quicker and simpler option is
a Chapter 7 liquidation. 5 Chapter 7 debtors discharge most debts but relinquish
all assets except property they are allowed to exempt (that is, keep) from
creditors. 6 The second option, available for individuals with stable and
4. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,563 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(noting that "policies of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors and
ensuring a 'fresh start' for individual debtors ... are at the core of federal bankruptcy law");
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("One of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and
permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes."') quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1915))).
5. 11 u.s.c. §§ 706-728 (2000).
6. Chapter 7 is an administratively simpler proceeding because debtors are not required
to attempt debt repayment and, thus, receive a discharge once the case is over. See, e.g.,
EUZABETH WARREN & IA Y LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 42226 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 options). Principally for policy reasons,
Congress made some debts-including student loans, alimony and child support, debts based on
fraudulent acts, debts related to drunk driving, and certain taxes-nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (2000). Debtors can exempt the property listed in the exemption provisions contained
in the Code unless they reside in a state that denies them this option and, instead, requires them
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regular income, is to restructure and then attempt to repay at least some debts
over a three to five year period in a Chapter 13 debt adjustment proceeding. 7
Because Chapter 13 debtors repay their debts from future income, they are not
required to liquidate their assets. For this reason, debtors typically choose
Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 in order to keep homes, cars, and other nonexempt
assets. 8
Chapter 13 debtors are not, however, required to repay all their debts.
Instead, they must devote all their "disposable income" to making payments
pursuant to their Chapter 13 plan.9 Disposable income is defined as the
debtor's income that is not "reasonably necessary" to pay for maintenance or
support of the debtor or his dependents. 10 The Code does not define the word
"dependent" and courts have reached conflicting results when asked to decide
whether the term requires a legal or familial relationship. For example, some
courts have concluded that a dependent includes anyone who reasonably relies
on the Chapter 13 debtor for support and for whom the debtor has reason to and
does support financially. 11 Courts adopting this broad view have permitted
debtors to exclude expenses they incurred to support adult children,
parents, or grandchildren from disposable income. 12 Other courts have
to exempt property under applicable state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (d) (2000).
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330(2000). AnindividualcanfileforreliefunderChapter 12if
he is a family farmer with regular income or under Chapter 11 if his debts exceed certain
amounts provided in the Code. Otherwise, he must file for relief under either Chapter 7 or 13.
11 u.s.c. § 109 (2000).
8. See Raisa Bahchieva, Susan Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt,
Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability ofHomeownership (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 23, on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (explaining that homeowners disproportionately
choose Chapter 13 because Chapter 7 does not protect home equity); see also WARREN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 423-26 (discussing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 options).
9. 11 U.S.C. § l325(b)(1)(B) (2000).
10. /d. § 1325(b)(2).
11. Sequeira v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Sequeria), 278 B.R. 861,867 (Bankr. D.
Ot. 2001); Leslie Womack Real Estate, Inc. v. Dunbar (In re Dunbar), 99 B.R. 320, 324 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1989).
12. See In re Gonzales, 297 B.R. 143, 150-51 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003) (explaining that
dependents can consist of more than the "nuclear" family). The opinion stated:
While Ward and June Cleaver and their two sons Wally and Beaver may represent
for many people the "typical" or "normal" family, tens of millions (or more) of the
population of this country live in family or household units that include one or
more adult children and/or their children, (great) grandparents and (great)
grandchildren, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, and cousins of various
degrees of relationship, to say nothing of "blended" families (children from their
parents' previous marriages brought together into one family), and families that
foster a child or take in a neighbor child escaping a bad situation at home. Indeed,
for much of the history of this country, the extended family was more common and
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adopted a more restrictive view and have refused to exclude expenses for
nonlegal dependents-even if the. individuals are actually dependent on the
debtor for support-because of a reluctance to make creditors subsidize the
debtor's lifestyle choice to support parents, adult children, grandchildren, or
domestic partners (and their children). 13 Ironically, though some courts refuse
to let debtors give financial support to their nonlegal dependents, debtors have
a statutory right to give money to charitable institutions and to exclude those
donations from disposable income. 14 Once Chapter 13 debtors devote their
disposable income (however calculated) to making plan payments, they are then
relieved from repaying their remaining dischargeable debts. 15
Even if a Chapter 7 debtor theoretically has income that could be used to
repay her debts in a Chapter 13 proceeding, she is not required to do so. Courts
· can, however, dismiss Chapter 7 cases if they conclude that granting
bankruptcy relief would be a "substantial abuse" of the Code. 16 Because of the
concern that allowing Chapter 7 debtors with "means" to avoid repaying their
debts is abusive, some courts dismiss Chapter 7 cases if they find that the

traditional than the "nuclear" family.
Id.; see also In re Bauer, 309 B.R. 47,51-52 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2004) (accepting a mother as a
dependent); In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. at 609-11 (stating that adult children can be dependents);
In re Smith, 269 B.R. 686, 689-90 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 2001) (accepting adult daughter as
dependent); In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513,515 n.l (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (allowing an adult
daughter to be claimed as a dependent); In re Wegner, 91 B.R. 854,859 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988)
(deciding to allow adult children and grandchildren as dependents); In reTracey, 66 B.R. 63,67
(Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (allowing the mother to be considered a dependent).
13. See Meier v. United States Tr. (In re Meier), 295 B.R. 625, 629-31 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(forbidding the defendant from counting his live-in girlfriend and her children as dependents);
In re Beharry, 264 B.R. 398, 404 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 2001) (declining to accept second wife's
minor child as dependent); In re Cox, 249 B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000) (excluding
mother, fiance, and fiance's children as dependents); In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 37 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000)(denying the mother as a dependent); In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171, 17879 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996) (excluding domestic partner and her four children as dependents); In
re Richmond, 144 B.R. 539, 542 (Bankr. W.O. Okla. 1992) (excluding grandchildren as
dependents); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (refusing to recognize
nonresident children as dependents).
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (2000) (explicitly providing that debtors may exclude
charitable contributions of up to 15% of their gross income from disposable income
calculation).
15. Chapter 13 debtors are said to receive a "super" discharge because there are fewer
nondischargeable debts in Chapter 13 cases than in Chapter 7 cases. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523
(2000) (listing nondischargeable Chapter 7 debts) with 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2000) (listing
nondischargeable Chapter 13 debts). For example, while debts that are fraudulently incurred
and debts that result from a debtor's willful and malicious conduct are nondischargeable in a
Chapter 7 case, they can be discharged in Chapter 13.
16. 11
§ 707(b) (2000).

u.s.c.
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debtor has sufficient current or future income to repay those debts in a Chapter
13 proceeding. 17 Courts also have dismissed Chapter 7 cases for substantial
abuse when a debtor's proposed budget included household expenses perceived
to be unnecessary or extravagant, 18 including private school tuition payments
for the debtor's minor children. 19 Courts also have dismissed Chapter 7
petitions when the debtor or debtors sought to pay college expenses for their
adult children or budgeted for financial support they voluntarily provided to
nonlegal dependents like parents or grandchildren. 20 Again, while debtors may
be denied Chapter 7 relief if their budgets include payments to nonlegal
dependents, they are allowed to give money to a charitable institution and not
risk having their Chapter 7 case dismissed. 21

17. See, e.g., Price v. United States Tr. (In rePrice), 353 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir.
2004) (rejecting debtor's claim that the trial court erred in finding substantial abuse because his
debts were primarily trade debts); Behlke v. Eisen (In re Behlke), 358 F.3d 429, 434-38 (6th
Cir. 2004) (finding that debtor's voluntary contribution to 401K plan was not reasonably
necessary to the maintenance and support of debtor and dependents and could be included in
gross income).
18. See Behlke, 358 F.3d at 435-36 (finding that monthly contribution to 401K retirement
plan was not reasonably necessary); In re Siemen, 294 B.R. 276, 278-80 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2003) (concluding that debtors with $60,000 annual income could pay a meaningful dividend of
their debts in a Chapter 7 plan "[w]ith some belt tightening"); In re Faulhaber, 243 B.R. 281,
287 (Bankr. E. D. Tex. 1999) (stating that the debtors maintained a far more lavish lifestyle than
most citizens in the area).
19. See Lynch v. Tate (In re Lynch), 299 B.R. 776, 780 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2003)
(upholding a ruling that private school tuition for dependent children was not a reasonably
necessary expense); In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69,76-77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (concluding
that debtors failed to prove that private school tuition was not a luxury expense).
20. See In re Siemen, 294 B.R. at 279 (refusing to allow debtor to support adult son and
daughter and two minor grandchildren because doing so would force creditors to support
nondependent family members); United States Tr. v. Staub (In re Staub), 256 B.R. 567, 571
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000) (characterizing educational expenses for adult children as discretionary
and concluding that creditors should not be effectively forced to pay them); In re Stallman, 198
B.R. 491, 495-97 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) (dismissing case where schedules included college
education expenses for disabled but emancipated son because of the court's view that the son's
college education "should not be wholly financed by the Debtor's creditors"); In re Richmond,
144 B.R. 539, 542 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992)(dismissing case where debtors included voluntary
support of their grandchildren); In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897, 902-03 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991)
(finding substantial abuse where debtor sent $750 monthly to two children who were living
away from home at college); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)
(dismissing case where debtors had listed college expenses for their emancipated daughter). But
cf In re Marcoux, 301 B.R. 381, 386 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (finding "untenable and undue the
proposition that providing food for one's stepchildren is indicative of the kind of extravagant
lifestyle that the substantial abuse provision of§ 707(b) was intended to curb").
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (mandating that courts ignore a debtor's charitable
contributions when considering whether to dismiss a petition for substantial abuse).
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B. Structure
1. Treatment of Debts
The Code specifies both the order in which debts and the costs associated
with bankruptcy cases will be paid and which debts can never be discharged.
Administrative expenses, which include the fees incurred by attorneys,
accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers, are entitled to the highest priority of
payrnent. 22 Assuming the case is administratively solvent, these expenses will
be paid before prepetition unsecured clairns. 23 Because more than 95% of
Chapter 7 cases are not administratively solvent and instead are no-asset
cases, 24 most Chapter 7 debtors' counsel demand to be paid before the case is
filed. 25 Based largely on policy grounds, the Code also gives priority payment
treatment to certain unsecured claims, including a portion of an employee's
wages and wage-related claims, family support debts (that is, alimony and child
support), and certain tax clairns. 26 In addition to being a priority claim, family
support obligations are presumptively nondischargeable. While obligations
and payments "in the nature of support" (generally, child support

22. /d. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b).
23. /d. §§ 503(b)(2), 503(b)(4 ), 327(a). Creditors who have a security interest in property
the debtor owns have the right to be paid in full on their claim or to receive the collateral that
secures their claim before administrative claimants are paid. /d. §§ 725, 1325(a). In business
cases, however, creditors often agree to a "carve out" that allows administrative claimants
(typically attorneys and accountants) to be paid from the collateral that secures their claims. In
re Molten Metal Tech., Inc., 244 B.R. 515, 521-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).
24. A no-asset case is a case in which there are no assets to distribute to unsecured
creditors because the only assets available are those that are either exempt (and, thus, the debtor
can keep) or that serve as collateral for a secured claim (and, thus, another creditor will be
allowed to take). WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 193; see also Elizabeth Warren,
What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial lAw, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics,
25 HARv. WoMEN's L. J. 19,41 n.79 (2002) (citing a Justice Department Report estimating that
only 3.6% of Chapter 7 cases are asset cases).
25. See In re Burton, 278 B.R. 645,652 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2001) (suggesting that lawyer
placed debtor in Chapter 13 because those fees need not be paid in advance); In re San Miguel,
40 B.R. 481, 485-86 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (refusing to confirm a Chapter 13 plan that was
filed simply to allow the client to pay the attorney's fees over time); see also Gordon v. Hines
(In re Hines), 147 F.3d 1185, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the fee recovery problems faced
by attorneys in Chapter 7 proceedings when they accept a minimal payment at the outset and an
agreement from the client for further payment from postfiling earnings).
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(7), (a)(8) (2000). Given the number of priority
claimants, even in administratively solvent Chapter 7 cases, general unsecured creditors
typically receive little, if any, payments on their claims. See, e.g., Warsco v. Preferred
Technical Group, 258 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the unsecured creditors
received nothing from the bankruptcy estate).
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or alimony) can never be discharged, debtors can sometimes discharge
nonsupport obligations (typically equitable property distributions or obligations
arising in hold-harmless agreements) ordered as part of a divorce or
separation. 27
Moreover, student loans are presumptively nondischargeable in both
Chapter 7 and 13 cases. Debtors can discharge student loan debt only if they
can prove that repaying the debt would impose an "undue hardship" on them
and their dependents. 28 The Code does not define "dependent" in this context
either, and as previously stated, some courts use a flexible definition that
includes nonlegal dependents who rely on the debtor for support if the debtor
has reason t~and actually does-support them. 29 Other courts have refused
to consider the expenses of a debtor's adult child or any other nonlegal
dependent-even if that person actually depends on the debtor for financial
support-when deciding whether it would be an undue hardship to force the
debtor to repay a student loan. 30
When determining whether to discharge student loan debt, courts also
refuse to consider whether the debtor received any legitimate educational
benefits from the school that received the loan proceeds. Instead, if the court
concludes that forcing the debtor to repay the loan would not be an undue
financial hardship, the loan debt is nondischargeable even if the debtor received
no marketable skills or training from the school. 31 While most courts use a
fairly onerous three-part undue hardship test, 32 one circuit court recently
27. Chapter 13 debtors have an unqualified right to discharge nonsupport debts. II
U.S.C. § I328(a)(2) (2000). Chapter 7 debtors can discharge nonsupport obligations if the
debtor does not have the ability to pay the debt from income that is not needed to support the
debtor or his dependents or if the benefit the debtor receives from discharging the debt is greater
than the harm the former spouse would suffer if the debt is discharged. II U.S.C. § 523(a)(l5)
(2000).
28. II U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
29. See Sequeira v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Sequeira), 278 B.R. 861, 866
(Bankr. D. Or. 2001) (accepting mother as a viable dependent); In re Marro, 1999 Bankr.
LEXIS 1897 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1999) (denying debtor's request to consider the three minor
children of his live-in as dependants); In re Rigdon, 133 B.R. 460, 463-64 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1991) (allowing mother to be considered a dependent).
30. See Mitcham v. U.S. Dep't ofEduc. (In re Mitcham), 293 B.R. 138, 141, 145 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2003) (considering expenses of grandchildren but refusing to consider expenses of
debtor's adult son even though the son was disabled).
31. See Pace v. Educ. Credit Mgrnt. Corp. (In re Pace), 288 B.R. 788,792 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2003) (noting that courts should not "consider the lack of value or benefit of the
education" when deciding whether debtors are entitled to an undue hardship discharge of
student loan debt).
32. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th
Cir. 1998) (setting forth three-part undue hardship test); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v.
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rejected this test and, instead, applied a less restrictive "totality of the
circumstances" test that considers whether ''the debtor's reasonable future
financial resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debtwhile still allowing for a minimal standard of living. "33 In addition, though
most bankruptcy courts originally refused to partially discharge loan debt/4
bankruptcy and district courts increasingly are granting debtors a partial
discharge of loan debt if the debtor demonstrates that requiring him to repay all
loans in full on the original terms would be an undue hardship. 35
Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Ammirati v. Nellie Mae
Inc., No. 95-2967, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10916, at *1 (4th Cir. May 10, 1996) (same); Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1995)
(same). Under this test, originally devised by the Second Circuit in Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987), a debtor must prove:
( 1) that forcing him to repay the loan will not allow him to maintain a minimal standard of
living for himself and his dependents given his current income and expenses, (2) that facts
indicate that this state of affairs is unlikely to change during the loan repayment period, and
(3) that he has made a good faith effort to repay the loan.
33. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554-55 (8th Cir.
2003).
34. See, e.g., Ill. StudentAssistanceComm'n v. Cox, 273 B.R. 719,723 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(concluding that the Bankruptcy Code mandates an "all or nothing" approach to student loan
debt dischargeability); Mallinckrodt v. Chemical Bank (In re Mallinckrodt), 260 B.R. 892, 904
(Bankr. S.D. Aa. 2001) ("To authorize partial discharges is tantamount to judicial legislation
and is something that should be left to Congress."); Brown v. Union Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re
Brown), 249 B.R. 525, 530 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000) (finding nothing in the Code that allows
the court to restructure or reduce student loan debt); Unites States v. Kephart, 170 B.R. 787,
788, 793 (W.D.N. Y. 1994) (reversing bankruptcy court's order for partial discharge of student
loan debt); Skidmore v. N. Mich. Univ., No. M88-308 CA2, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431, at
*13 (W.O. Mich. Sept. 11, 1989) (finding that bankruptcy court decision "granting a partial
discharge to the instant appellee was erroneous"); Brown v. Citi Bank (NYS) Higher Educ.
Loan Program ofKan., Inc., No. 86-2220-S, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3619, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr.
27, 1987) ("'n reviewing the applicable case law, the court found only a few cases where a
partial discharge of the educational loans was granted.").
35. See Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that bankruptcy courts may partially discharge student loans); Andresen
v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 136-37 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
1999) (holding that if debtor has multiple student loans, individual undue hardship analysis of
each is "not only allowed, it [is] required"); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Mort (In re
Mort), 272 B.R. 181, 184-85 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002)(agreeingthattheCode "does not require
an 'all or nothing' approach to the discharge of student loans" and that the court has the power
to partially discharge loan debt); Sequeira v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Sequeira), 278
B.R. 861, 865 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001) (stating that partial discharge of student loan debts is
permissible); Coutts v. Mass. Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Coutts), 263 B.R. 394,401 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2001) (same); Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866,873-74
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (concluding that if debtor has multiple student loans court can discharge
some and require repayment of others); see also Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In
re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a bankruptcy court may
partially discharge student debt); Hinkle v. Wheaton College (In re Hinkle), 200 B.R. 690, 693
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Credit card debt is presumptively dischargeable, which is fortunate (for
debtors, that is) because most households have credit cards and almost all
consumer bankruptcy cases involve credit card debt. 36 However, credit card
issuers can rebut the presumption of dischargeability if they prove that the
debtor fraudulently incurred the debt. 37 Nondischargeability complaints based
on credit card debt are frequently and contentiously litigated disputes. in
consumer bankruptcy cases. 38 Courts increasingly have ruled, however, that
credit card issuers cannot prevent debtors from discharging credit card debt if
they failed to properly screen debtors before giving them credit cards or failed
to monitor debtors' spending patterns or employment status after issuing the
cards. 39 Indeed, these court losses caused the credit card industry to lobby
Congress to seek legislation that would make it harder to discharge debts. 40
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding that if debtor has multiple student loans the court can
discharge some of the loans); Griffin v. Eduserv (In re Griffin), 197 B.R. 144, 147 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1996) (discharging debtor's interest and attorneys' fees but requiring repayment of
principal amount); Raimondo v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Raimondo), 183
B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Although the Bankruptcy Code might not expressly
provide for the partial discharge of educational loans, it does require that these debts not be
discharged in the absence of undue hardship. If necessary to achieve this purpose, partial
discharge is an appropriate remedy.").
36. See SUWVAN, supra note I, at 119-20 (citing data that suggest that 88% of debtors
may have credit card debt); EUZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GoiNG BROKE 131 ("Ninety-one percent
of the families in bankruptcy were carrying balances on their cards by the time they filed.");
Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household Financial Management: The
Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, FEDERAL REsERVE BUUEI1N 309, 310 (July
2003) (reporting consumer survey in which 89% of households reported having credit cards).
37. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391,402 (5th Cir.
2001) (observing that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) exempts from discharge fraudulently obtained
debt).
38. See generally WIU..IAM D. WARREN & DANIELJ. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 186-87 (6th
ed. 2002) (discussing high volume of credit card nondischargeability cases).
39. See Citibank v. Stephens (In re Stephens), 302 B.R. 227, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2003) (discharging credit card debt because issuer failed to conduct a credit check even though
the court found that debtor incurred debt with no intention of repaying it); Compass Bank v.
Meyer (In re Meyer), 296 B.R. 849, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003) (criticizing credit card issuers
who extend credit without performing a credit check or increase credit limits based on past
payment performance without confirming current income or debt levels); Am. Express Travel
Related Servs., Inc. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592, 595 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(finding it "absolutely appalling" and "difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend how" credit
card issuer granted seven credit cards to an unemployed widow with two minor children);
WARREN & BussEL, supra note 38, at 190-91 (discussing emerging theory that credit card
companies that fail to conduct adequate credit checks cannot justifiably rely on customers'
implied promises to pay); cf. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 408 (noting that debtors' financial condition,
charge characteristics, and employment status are used as indicia of scienter for fraud).
40. See Lou Dobbs, In Hock to the Hilt, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 21, 2003, at 36
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Finally, mortgage obligations, though technically dischargeable, are
largely unaffected in bankruptcy cases. While a debtor's personal obligation to
repay home mortgage debt can be discharged, the mortgage holder's lien on the
debtor's home survives the bankruptcy.41 Thus, even if the loan is a
nonrecourse loan or the debtor receives a discharge and is not personally
obligated to repay the mortgage, the creditor can foreclose on the debtor's home
even after the debtor receives a discharge.
2. Treatment of Assets

Most of a debtor's prepetition assets are included in the bankruptcy estate
and can be used to pay creditor claims.42 While assets acquired after the
bankruptcy petition is filed are excluded from the estates of Chapter 7 debtors,
those assets (including future wages) are included in Chapter 13 estates.43 The
Code does, however, exclude certain types of property from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate and also allows debtors to exempt property to ensure that
debtors who leave bankruptcy will not be destitute. Specifically, the Code
excludes from a debtor's estate property that is held in trust or is subject to a
restriction on transfer under applicable nonbankruptcy laws. 44 Thus, if the
debtor is the beneficiary of money held in a trust that contains a spendthrift
clause, the debtor can keep the money and cannot be forced to use it to pay
creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding.45 Likewise, regardless of the
value of the account, funds held in employer-provided ERISA-qualified (and

(describing contrasting perspectives on then-pending bankruptcy legislation); Philip Shenon,
Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 13,2001, at A1 ("Sponsors of
the bill acknowledge that lawyers and lobbyists for the banks and credit card companies were
involved in drafting it."); see also Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress,
TiME, May 15, 2000, at 64-65 (arguing that Congress aggressively pursued bankruptcy reform
because of campaign contributions members received from various banks, credit card
companies, debt consolidators, and other financial-services businesses and because of the urging
of the credit industry's politically influential lobbyists).
41. See Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.
2002) ("In general, Chapter 13 allows debtors to avoid liens, but there is an exception for
homestead liens that attach only to the debtor's primary residence.").
42. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
43. Id. § 1306(a).
44. Id. § 541(c)(2).
45. Most courts have ruled that a debtor's interest in a self-settled trust cannot be
excluded from the estate. See, e.g., In re Edelmann, 308 B.R. 398, 400-02 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
2004) (finding that trust could not be excluded from estate because debtor's retained control
over trust rendered it invalid under Missouri law).
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certain other state and federal) retirement plans are excluded from the
bankruptcy estate because these plans typically restrict the debtor's and the plan
provider's ability to transfer or otherwise disburse the funds held in the plan. 46
There is a wide disparity among state laws in the type and amount of estate
property debtors are allowed to exempt. Because of the public policy that
favors home ownership, debtors may take a homestead exemption that lets them
keep at least a portion of the value of their home. 47 Indeed, seven states
(including Florida and Texas) permit debtors to exempt the entire value of their
home from all creditors except those who have a consensual security interesttypically the mortgage holder-in the home. 48 If allowed by the debtor's
applicable state exemption laws, a debtor can also keep real or personal
property the debtor and his spouse own as tenants by the entirety and can
prevent creditors from seizing that property regardless of its value. 49 In
46. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,765 (1992); see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a) (2000)
(providing that federal civil service retirement benefits are generally not assignable); id.
§ 8470(a) (providing same for Federal Employees Retirement System benefits); 10 U.S.C.
§ 1450(h) (2000) (providing same for military survivor annuities); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)(A)
(2000) (providing that benefits from ERISA-qualified plan "may not be assigned or alienated").
47. See TEREsA A. SUUJVAN ET AL., As WE FORGNE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 138-39 ( 1989) (noting that all states restrict the forced sale of
debtors' homes); Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale ofTwo Solutions, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 221, 222, 247 n.8 (1997) (surveying state homestead exemptions; observing that
only two states-Pennsylvania and Rhode Island-have no state exemption, and that neither has
opted out of the federal exemption scheme). Likewise, the Code and most state exemption laws
permit debtors to exempt at least part of the value of their automobiles, household goods, and
tools of the trade or other professional supplies. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000) (allowing
exemption of, inter alia, a motor vehicle, household items, jewelry, and professional tools and
equipment, up to various value ceilings); FLA. CoNST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (2004) (exempting
personal property up to $1,000); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/12-1001 (2003) (same); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN.§ 2329.66 (2004) (exempting various categories of personal property); TEx.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.0001-0002 (2000) (allowing exemption of, inter alia, a motor vehicle
for each family member, home furnishings, jewelry, and livestock, up to a total of $60,000 for a
family or $30,000 for a single adult); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Supp. 2004) (providing for
similar exemptions).
48. See TEx. PRoP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (2000) (providing unlimited homestead
exemption); see also FLA. CONST., art. X,§ 4(a)(l) (same). While Texas, Aorida, and five other
states provide an unlimited exemption, debtors in half of the fifty states are entitled to exempt
$20,000 or less. Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 18.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l)(B) (2000). Estimates of the number of jurisdictions that still
allow married couples to shield property held as tenants by the entirety from their creditors
range from seventeen to thirty-seven. A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the
Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of
Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 94 n.138 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that, notwithstanding applicable state laws,
married couples cannot exempt such property from tax claims asserted by the Internal Revenue
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addition to allowing married debtors to exempt property held in tenancies by
the entirety, the Code makes it harder to sell entirety property even if it is
nonexempt. 5°
Even if debtors do not own entirety property or cannot take an unlimited
homestead exemption, debtors-especially Chapter 13 debtors-who own
homes and have equity in those homes have greater protections than renters
even if they have fallen behind on their mortgage payments. Indeed, even if the
mortgage holder has accelerated the mortgage loan and has sued the debtor for
the loan balance, the mortgage holder will have difficulty foreclosing on a
Chapter 13 debtor's home if the debtor continues to make mortgage payments
and agrees to cure the loan default through the Chapter 13 plan. 5 1 In contrast,
debtors generally will not be allowed to remain in rented residential property if
they have missed rental payments unless they cure the default in full and give
the landlord assurances that there will be no future defaults. 52 Moreover, in

Service. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). Courts have not, however, been
willing to extend that holding to debtors in bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., In re Greathouse, 295
B.R. 562, 565-67 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003) ("[T]he recognition of the tax collection rights of the
United States enunciated in the Craft decision is not material to the decision presented to this
court in this case, and is not a development in the law that changes the settled authority on this
issue."); In re Ryan, 282 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2002) (concluding that Craft's rationale
is limited to federal taxation and does not extend to bankruptcy); In re Knapp, 285 B.R. 176,
182-83 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002) (discussing Craft in bankruptcy but refusing to extend
holding).
50. While a bankruptcy trustee ordinarily has the power to sell a debtor's nonexempt
property free and clear of any other interest, a trustee can sell entirety property only if: ( 1) the
property cannot easily be partitioned; (2) selling only the estate's interest would yield
significantly less than selling the property free of the non debtor spouse's interest; and (3) the
benefit (to the debtor's bankruptcy estate) of selling the home outweighs the harm to the
nondebtor spouse. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(h)(1)-(3) (2000) (listing conditions under which
bankruptcy trustee can sell property held by tenants in common, joint tenants, or tenants by the
entirety).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(l) (2000) (allowing debtor to cure mortgage defaults until
foreclosure sale completed). A creditor is entitled to relief from the automatic stay imposed by
§ 362 of the Code only if it can show cause, including a lack of adequate protection of the
creditor's interest in the debtor's property or if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the
debtor does not need the property. Id. § 362(d)(l)-(2).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2000); see Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth. (In re Stoltz), 315
F.3d 80, 94 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[C]reditors also receive protection from the Bankruptcy Code. In
order to assume an unexpired lease, the executory contract provision requires the bankruptcy
trustee to cure defaults, ... compensate for losses, ... and provide adequate assurance [of future
payments]."); In re DiCamillo, 206 B.R. 64, 71-72 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (rejecting debtor's
proposal to pay rental arrearages over three years); Hobbs v. Long (In re Trusty), 189 B.R. 977,
982-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) ("Cure of a default in making payments means that a debtor
must pay the payment arrearage in full.").
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Chapter 7 cases, renters must cure any default within sixty days after the case is
filed. 53
Finally, the Code and some state laws also permit debtors to exempt
certain monetary payments they are entitled to receive if those payments are
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or his dependents. 54 The
Code provides a partial definition for the term "dependent" by stating that it
includes a spouse, even one who is not actually dependent on the debtor. 55
Unfortunately, courts (again) have not explicitly ruled that debtors have the
right to exempt property used by nonlegal dependents including adult children,
parents, grandchildren, unmarried cohabitants, same-sex partners, or other
family members. 56
C. Criticisms and Uses of Existing Bankruptcy Laws

Critics of existing bankruptcy laws argue that courts do not adequately
detect and dismiss abusive filings, that discharging debts has become too easy,
and that bankruptcy no longer carries any stigma with it. 57 The reason people

53. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(l) (2000)(providing that under Chapter 7, executory contracts
not assumed by trustee within sixty days of relief order are deemed rejected); In re Stoltz, 3I5
F.3d at 86 (quoting statute); Couture v. Burlington Hous. Auth. (In re Couture), 225 B.R. 58, 63
(D. Vt. I998) (explaining statute).
54. Exempt payments include social security, public assistance, veterans', disability,
illness, and unemployment benefits; alimony, support, separate maintenance, and most stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, and annuity payments; and certain wrongful death, life
insurance, and personal injury payments. II U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)-(11) (2000); see also, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 222.I4 (2004) (exempting life insurance and annuity benefits); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 222.I8 (2004) (exempting disability income benefits); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.21 (2004)
(exempting pension, retirement, or profit-sharing benefits); 7351LL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/121006 (2003) (exempting retirement plans, including social security); VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-34
(Supp. 2004) (exempting certain retirement plans).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (2000),
56. See In re Sommer, 228 B.R. 674,677-78 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998) (adopting a broad
definition of dependent but finding that parents were not dependent on adult son); In re Rigdon,
133 B.R. 460, 465-67 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) (adopting broad definition of dependent that
might allow parents to be treated as dependent of son); In re Collopy, 99 B.R. 384, 384 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1989) (defining dependent to include debtor's mother, who was physically dependent
on the debtor, even though she was not financially dependent on the debtor).
57. See WARREN & TvAGI, supra note 36, at I7, 94-95 (2003) (presenting criticisms most
often raised against existing bankruptcy relief); Daniel McGinn et al., Maxed out, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 27, 200I, at 34,37 (discussing the "lack of discipline" in consumer credit card spending).
See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?, 75
AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 261-267 (2001) (discussing the negative image of debtors portrayed in
the media).
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file for bankruptcy is hotly debated. The simple explanation is that people file
because they cannot pay their debts. Of course, the simplicity of this
explanation begs the question of why so many people have been unable to pay
their bills, especially during times of economic prosperity. Scholars and
commentators agree that credit card use, uninsured medical expenses, divorcerelated expenses, and economic reversals (like being laid off, downsized or
outsourced, or being forced into part-time or contract work) all cause people to
seek bankruptcy relief. 58 Some suggest, however, that consumers could
weather most financial setbacks without filing for bankruptcy if they stopped
overusing credit cards, exercised greater fiscal responsibility, and made a
commitment to honoring and repaying their debts. 59
Because of intense lobbying efforts from the consumer credit (especially
the credit card) lobby, Congress has been under intense pressure for almost a
decade to enact legislation that would prevent people deemed to have "means"
from discharging their debts. 60 Though various methods have been proposed to
calculate whether a debtor has the "means" to repay current debts, the goal of
the legislation is quite simple: discourage people from filing for bankruptcy
and force those who do to repay their debts in Chapter 13. 61 Despite ample
58. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 36, at 80-81 ("Nearly nine out of ten families with
children cite just three reasons for their bankruptcies: job loss, family breakup, and medical
problems."); see also Melissa Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care
Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377 (2001)
(estimating that nearly half of all bankruptcies involve a medical problem); Donald L. Barlett &
James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64 ("Contrary to the popular view
of bankruptcy filers as free spenders who vacation in the Caribbean and buy expensive jewelry
on their credit cards, the vast majority turn to bankruptcy court only after one of three events:
loss of job, divorce or extraordinary medical expenses-in short, the kind of misfortune that can
befall anyone."); Terry Savage, The Savage Truth, CHI. SUN-TiMEs, Feb. 20, 2003, at 59 ("It's a
myth to think that bankruptcies are caused by the desire to commit fraud. In the largest
percentage of cases, bankruptcy is preceded by unexpected budget-breaking expenses of
uninsured medical costs or divorce.").
59. See Jathon Sapsford & Patrick Barta, Precarious Balances: Despite the Recession,
Americans Continue to be Avid Borrowers; Their Spending Helps Temper the Downturn, but
Debts Could Hinder a Recovery; "I Want to Enjoy Everything", WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A1
(discussing 24-year-old Steven Yamamoto, who had racked up $28,000 of debt on six credit
cards, while enjoying a mere $35,000 yearly salary); see, e.g., Deborah Moore, Rise in
Bankruptcies Blamed on Overuse of Credit Cards, CAPITAL. DIST. Bus. REv., Jan. 27, 1997, at
22 (explaining that "individuals are not sunk by secured debt like mortgage or car loans, but by
a slew of unsecured credit card debts"); Maureen Feighan & R.J. King, Thousands Sink in
Ocean of Heavy Debt, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 8, 2002, at 1A (suggesting ways to avoid severe
debt by curbing credit card use).
60. See Robert Heady, Consumers Take 1-2 Punch: House and Senate Legislation Would
Make It Much Harder for Debtors to Declare Bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1998, at C7
(describing consumer credit industry's lobbying efforts).
61. See Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem ofMeans, 7
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evidence that most Chapter 13 cases are dismissed before debtors complete
plan payments, 62 the credit lobby has convinced many members of Congress
that too many people with income sufficient to repay their bills choose not to
pay them, that permitting debtors to make this choice is not consistent with the
goals of bankruptcy laws, and that preventing debtors from discharging debts
will cause them to repay those debts. 63
Whether the increased filing rate is attributable to exogenous factors
beyond the debtor's control, to debtors' irresponsible or fraudulent conduct, 64
or to creditors' increasingly lax lending practices (especially those involving
credit card lending),65 the number of people who have filed for bankruptcy has
increased dramatically during the last ten years. In 2003, 1,625,208
individuals filed for bankruptcy: an increase of 5.6% from the 1,539,111 that

FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 411 (2002) (observing that proposed changes would make
Chapter 7 "more expensive and inaccessible" and Chapter 13 "more burdensome and
unworkable").
62. See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 22 (stating that only 33% of Chapter 13 debtors
complete plan payments, that 33% convert to Chapter 7 and that the remainder are dismissed
from bankruptcy); see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 456-57 (discussing
studies).
63. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
108th Cong. §§ 301-330 (2003) (taking various steps to restrict perceived abuses by debtors);
H.R. REP. No. 108-40, at 124-25 (2003) (stating a factor behind the passage of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act is the increase in bankruptcy debtors who can
pay off their debt). Many Congressmen believe the bill will help curb the abuse of the
bankruptcy system by those able to pay their debts, while still protecting those unable to repay
personal debts. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Adam Putnam, Putnam Hails Praises of
Bankruptcy Reform: Congressman Says Plan Helps Stem the Rise of Bankruptcy Abuse, at
http://www.adamputnam.house.gov/pressreleaseslbankruptcy.doc (Mar. 19, 2003) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of2003, and the Need for Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 17 (2003)
(statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/85404.PDF (claiming the bill will compromise the goal of
bankruptcy law by making it harder for consumers to get a fresh start financially).
64. See, e.g., In re Santaella, 298 B.R. 793, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (stating that
debtor failed to disclose Venezuelan real estate, a million dollar plus bank account in
Switzerland, and his ownership and control of at least two valuable offshore corporations, then
attempted to conceal his ownership and control by creating and executing documents in the
names of two fictitious individuals); Feltman v. Warmus (In reAm. Way Serv. Corp.), 229 B.R.
496, 533-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that debtor fraudulently transferred a plane, boat,
and several luxury cars to defraud creditors).
65. See, e.g., AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 211 F.3d 214, 218
(5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "credit card issuers' irresponsible lending practices" lead to more
consumer bankruptcies); Compass Bank v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 296 B.R. 849, 863 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2003) (discussing issuers' failure to check debtors' income and debt levels).
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filed in 2002 and almost double the number (812,898) that filed in 1993.66
Thus, whether for good, bad, or no reason at all, more and more Americans are
taking advantage of the benefits provided in bankruptcy.

D. Costs
Bankruptcy is not an administratively cost-free proceeding. Though
litigants in almost every other judicial setting can file in forma pauperis and
have their filing fees waived, 67 debtors must pay a nonwaivable filing fee. 68 By
mandating that debtors find the funds to pay the nonwaivable filing fee, it
appears that some poor people are too poor to file for bankruptcy. 69 The only
concession the Code makes for paying filing fees involves married debtors,
who are allowed to file a joint petition and pay only one filing fee. 70 Because
only heterosexual married couples can file joint petitions, even if a long-term
cohabitating heterosexual couple or a married gay or lesbian couple desired to
file a joint petition and pay a lower filing fee, they could not do so. 71

66. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INS1ITUTE, U.S. BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 1980-2003, at
http://www .abiworld.orglcontentmanagementlcontentdisplay.cfm?contentid=8149 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2000) (giving courts the authority to allow proceedings in
forma pauperis, except in bankruptcy proceedings); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 57.081 (West
Supp. 2004) (allowing courts to waive filing fees for indigents); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
261, § 27B (1992) (allowing courts to waive filing fees for indigents); N.Y. CaMP. CoDESR. &
REGs. tit. 22, § 206.5 (2003) (allowing claimant to file for waiver or reduction of the filing fee).
68. The fees range from $155 for cases filed under Chapters 7 and 13 to $800 for Chapter
11 cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (2000). Additional quarterly fees are imposed in Chapter 11
cases. /d. § 1930(a)(6). While a few pilot tested programs permitted in forma pauperis filings
in six bankruptcy districts, the pilot program expired in 1997. Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-121, § 111(d), 107 Stat. 1153 (1993). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
IMPLEMENTING AND EvALUATING THE CHAPTER 7 FluNG FEE WAIVER PROGRAM ( 1998).
69. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 457 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(lamenting that "some of the poor are too poor even to go bankrupt"). The Kras Court held that
regardless of a debtor's indigence or need for financial relief, there is no constitutional right to a
discharge. /d. at 446. Because the Court concluded that bankruptcy is not the only way debtors
can restructure their debts, it held that a debtor who cannot afford the filing fee has no right to
federal bankruptcy relief. /d. at 445-46.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
71. See Bone v. Allen (/n re Allen), 186 B.R. 769, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995)
(disallowing joint petition of gay couple); In re Malone 50 B.R. 2, 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985)
(disallowing joint petition of long-term unmarried cohabitating couple who shared living
expenses and owned property jointly); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
See generally Dickerson, supra note 49, at 90-93.
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Debtors should also expect to pay attorney's fees ranging from $400 to
$17 50 if they file for relief under Chapter 7, and $400 to $3000 if they file a
Chapter 13 petition. 72 Married debtors who file a joint petition should incur
lower attorney's fees, but again this benefit is limited to heterosexual married
filers. While debtors can pay their Chapter 13 attorney's fees through their
plans, lawyers who represent debtors in Chapter 7 almost always demand to be
paid in full in advance. 73 Chapter 7 debtors are often advised to obtain the
filing or attorney fees by either borrowing the money from a friend or relative
or by not paying other monthly bills. 74 A person who does not receive this
advice (or does not think of this strategy on her own) may find herself unable to
obtain debt relief in bankruptcy unless she can find free or low-cost legal
services. Though most localities have pro bono bankruptcy programs or other
free legal services, those services are limited and most programs represent only
those debtors who have wages that are being, or are threatened with being,
garnished or nonexempt property that can be seized. 75 Because bankruptcy
petitions and schedules are long and detailed, filing pro se is simply not a
realistic option for most consumer filers. Moreover, even if a debtor has the
competence to accurately complete the petition and schedules, many
jurisdictions now require these items to be filed electronically. 76 Fortunately,
pro se debtors are currently exempted from the requirement. 77
72. The Consumer Bankruptcy Letter, Results of Survey on Fees, at
http://www.bankruptcyfinder.com/surveyresults.html (June 27, 2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); JAMES H. Cossm, AM. BANKR. INST., CHAPrER 13
ATIORNEY FEE SURVEY, American Bankruptcy Institute 2003 Annual Meeting, at
www.abiworld.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also BANKR. E.D. VA. LocAL BANKR. R. 2016-1 (setting the basic fee range from
$1250-1500 for Chapter 13 cases). Some courts will set a base fee with allowance for
additional fees based on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Guideline for Payment of
Attorney's Fees in Chapter 13 Cases (Bankr. N.D. Ca. 2003) (setting a base fee at $1800 and
allowing for additional fees to be added based on what is involved in the case, such as real
property or student loans).
73. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys in Chapter 7 cases
demand to be paid before the case is filed).
74. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEx.
L. REv. 2123, 2143-44 (2002) (observing lack of empirical studies concerning "how consumer
bankruptcy lawyers get paid" and observing that some lawyers reportedly advise "clients to skip
a mortgage or credit card payment to generate funds for a fee").
75. See MILLER CENTER FOR PUBUC INTEREST ADVOCACY, PRO BONO BANKRUPTCY
PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, at http://www.dsl.psu.edu/publications/ probono/pro bono.pdf(last
visited Nov. 16, 2004) (cataloguing pro bono bankruptcy programs throughout the nation) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. See Richmond Eustis, Mandatory Electronic Bankruptcy Filing Urged, FuLTON
CouNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 27, 2002, available at LEXIS, FULTON (requiring lawyers to
file bankruptcy cases electronically); Emily Umbright, Eastern District Goes Live with
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III. Racial Impact of Bankruptcy Relief
A. Ideal Debtor Profile

Though all individuals who file for bankruptcy should receive some debt
relief, a debtor who has certain types of debts, assets, and other economic
attributes (Ideal Debtor) will benefit significantly more than other filers. To
increase the likelihood of becoming an Ideal Debtor, debtors should have
sufficient disposable income--or have access to a relative or friend with such
income-to pay a lawyer for prefiling exemption planning advice, to pay the
bankruptcy filing fee, and to pay a bankruptcy lawyer to prepare the petition
and schedules. In addition, the Ideal Debtor should have few (if any)
nondischargeable debts, including student loans or alimony or child support
obligations. Because the Code (like most other state and federal laws) favors
heterosexual married debtors and lets them file a joint petition and exempt their
tenants by the entirety property from all but joint creditors, the Ideal Debtor
should also be married. 78 Even though bankruptcy laws were designed to
provide relief to the poor but honest debtor, the Ideal Debtor should either hold
most of her property in an exempt form or convert nonexempt property to
exempt property before filing for bankruptcy. 79 Indeed, to take full advantage
Electronic Case Filing Tuesday, ST. LoUIS DAILY REc., Oct. 14, 2003, available at LEXIS,
SLDREC (requiring lawyers to file bankruptcy cases electronically, but waiving electronic filing
fee for prose debtors); U.S. Bankruptcy Coun Electronic Filing Becomes Mandatory Oct. 1,
N.J. LAWYER, June 30, 2003, available at 2003 WLNJLNP 38 (requiring lawyers to file
bankruptcy cases electronically).
77. See Umbright, supra note 76 (requiring lawyers to file bankruptcy cases electronically
but waiving electronic filing fee for prose debtors).
78. See Dickerson, supra note 49, at 87-103 (describing marital bias in state and federal
laws). There is, of course, no corresponding benefit for cohabitating gay or straight couples
even if they share a home together with children and want to protect the home for the sake of
children. Id.
79. Debtors are allowed to take advantage of the exemptions allowed in bankruptcy by
converting nonexempt assets into exempt assets. See Hanson v. First Nat'! Bank in Brookings,
848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988) (allowing a debtor to convert nonexempt property into
exempt property, except where the debtor intends to defraud his creditors). It is true that some
courts will find that excessive prebankruptcy exemption planning constitutes fraud. See Vensen
v. Dietz (In re Sholdan), 217 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's
decision that a debtor's purchase of a house on the eve of bankruptcy constituted fraud); First
Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986,991 (5th Cir. 1983)(asserting that debtor's
intent to defraud in converting nonexempt assets will support denial of discharge). Nonetheless,
most courts allow debtors to engage in modest exemption planning. See Gill v. Stem (In re
Stem), 317 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the conversion of nonexempt assets
into exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy is not enough to establish fraud); Murphy v. Crater
(In re Crater), 286 B.R. 756,761 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (same); Noland v. Wadley (In re
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of bankruptcy exclusions and exemption provisions, the Ideal Debtor is either
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust or the possessor of a large ERISA-qualified
retirement fund that can be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. The Ideal
Debtor should be employed, unless she is an unemployed beneficiary of a trust
fund, because Chapter 13 debtors must have stable income in order to receive
the benefits Chapter 13 provides-the rights to keep assets but discharge
debts. 80 The Ideal Debtor should also have relativelyhigh (but necessary)
living expenses for herself and dependents with whom she has a legal or
familial relationship.
The Code systematically favors debtors with wealth over those with
income because it lets debtors~specially Chapter 13 debtors-retain some of
their property but requires them to use only disposable income to repay debts.
Given this, the Ideal Debtor should have high wealth but low income. 81
Wadley), 263 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding that a minimal level of
prebankruptcy planning does not constitute fraud). What is "modest" and "excessive" remains a
matter of dispute. Compare Hanson, 848 F.2d at 869 (allowing a small amount of preexemption planning by the debtors) with Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871,
876 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that debtor's "attempt to shield property worth approximately
$700,000 goes well beyond the purpose for which exemptions are permitted").
80. In re Donohue, 81 B.R. 714, 715 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (refusing to confirm
unemployed Chapter 13 debtor's plan even though he expected to be employed within two
months). While courts have concluded that debtors can fund plans with nonwage income
(including public assistance benefits, social security, fixed pension, investment income, funds
derived from self-employment, and funds provided by others) most Chapter 13 plans are funded
with a debtor's future wage income. See, e.g., Bibb County Dep't of Family & Children Serv. v.
Hope (In re Hammonds), 729 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (11th Cir. 1984) (funding plan with public
assistance benefits); In re Lapin, 302 B.R. 184, 188 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (funding plan with
exempt assets, including funds withdrawn from an individual retirement account); In re
Bottelberghe, 253 B.R. 256, 260 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (funding plan with spousal
contributions); In re Murphy, 226 B.R. 601,604 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (funding plan with
funds provided by debtor's unmarried cohabitating partner); In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); In re Murray, 199 B.R. 165, 166-70 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1996)
(funding seven year old debtor's plan with social security survivor benefits); In re Sigfrid, 161
B.R. 220, 222 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (finding that spouse's income could not be used to fund
Chapter 13 payments because such income was not "sufficiently stable and regular"); Howell v.
Commonwealth (In re Howell), 138 B.R. 484, 488 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (same); In re
McMonagle, 30 B.R. 899, 902 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983) (funding plan with unemployment
compensation); In re Monaco, 36 B.R. 882, 883-84 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (funding plan with
income determined by self-employed debtor); Margraf v. Oliver (In re Oliver), 28 B.R. 420,
423-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (same); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346,349 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1980)
(funding plan with income from odd jobs).
Moreover, employment also increases the likelihood that the debtor will participate in a
pension plan, which can be excluded from the estate and kept from creditors.
81. Wealth generally is defined as the current value of all household assets ("bank
accounts, stocks, bonds, life insurance savings, mutual fund shares; houses and unincorporated
businesses; consumer durables" and pensions) minus liabilities (mortgage balances, consumer
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Having a high income, though good in the abstract, is not as beneficial to
debtors as having significant wealth largely because a high-income debtor with
no assets will be unable to take advantage of most of the benefits in bankruptcy
whereas a lower income debtor who owns a home or other exempt assets (or
converts nonexempt property into exempt property) will. Low-income debtors
who have expensive, tangible, exemptible assets (like homes) can leave both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 with those exempt assets and will be required to
devote only part of their relatively low income to repaying prepetition debts in
Chapter 13.82 In contrast, high-income but no-exemptible-asset debtors leave
Chapter 7 with no assets and may even be denied a discharge if the court
concludes that it would be abusive to permit them to avoid using their future
income to repay their debts. Likewise, a high-income but no-exemptible-asset
debtor leaves Chapter 13 having to pay more of her debts than her high wealth
but low income counterpart. While some judicial districts have a high
percentage of Chapter 13 plans that repay creditors in full, most Chapter 13
debtors with modest incomes will repay only a limited amount of their debts,
especially if they have relatively high, reasonably necessary living expenses. 83
and other outstanding debts). EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY 2 (2d ed. 2002).
82. Some courts have concluded that a debtor cannot choose to have a lower income. See,
e.g., U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 92-93 {5th Cir. 2003)
(denying discharge because of court's view that debtor, philharmonic orchestra member, should
increase income with additional or higher paying job); Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In
re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 875 {Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) {discussing view that a Chapter 13 debtor
cannot voluntarily depress income by being underemployed).
Courts have held that they can consider a Chapter 7 debtor's exemptible incomeincluding tax refunds, social security, workers' compensation, and public assistance benefitswhen deciding whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse. See, e.g., In re
Sohn, 300 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) {requiring debtor to include "disposable
portion" of exempt income in Chapter 13 payment plan). Though these courts could not force
the Chapter 7 debtor to use the exemptible income to repay bills, they nonetheless include it
when calculating a hypothetical Chapter 13 disposable income test to determine whether
Chapter 7 petition should be dismissed for substantial abuse because the debtor has the means to
pay debts. Likewise, courts have concluded that exempt income must be included in a Chapter
13 debtor's disposable income even though the court cannot compel the debtor to liquidate the
property to fund the plan. See Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285, 1289{8th Cir. 1997)
(deciding that "exempt income not reasonably needed for support then becomes 'disposable
income' that must be paid to creditors"); In re Sohn, 300 B.R. at 335-36 (requiring debtor to
include "disposable portion" of exempt income in Chapter 13 payment plan); In re Gebo, 290
B.R. 168, 170 {Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (same).
83. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 557 {1993) {describing the efforts ofthe bankruptcy court in San Antonio
to increase their percentage of full payouts in Chapter 13 plans); William C. Whitford, The Ideal
of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer
Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,405-11 (1994) (citing a 1993
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While the Ideal Debtor should own an expensive home and preferably live
in a state that lets her exempt most, if not all, of the value of that home, she
should avoid having a significant amount of equity in the home. A Chapter 13
debtor who has significant equity in a home runs the risk of having a court
refuse to confirm her Chapter 13 repayment plan unless she sells her home and
uses the proceeds to both secure less expensive housing and repay some debts.
To ensure that she has little equity in her home, the debtor should decrease her
equity by refinancing her mortgage and using the proceeds to purchase
exemptible assets, add improvements to the home, or pay nondischargeable
debts like taxes, child support, or student loans. 84 Because credit card debt is
presumptively dischargeable, the Ideal Debtor who refinances her mortgage to
ensure she has little equity in her home should not use the proceeds to pay off
credit card or other nondischargeable debts.

B. Minority Demographics

1. The Family
The rearing or informal adoption of children by members of their extended
family for both short and long periods of time is more likely among blacks and
Hispanics than among other racial groups. 85 Over the past two decades, the
number of informally adopted children living with relatives has risen sharply
among black families-perhaps due to marriage or incarceration rates or
because of the difficulties black family members appear to face when they
attempt to adopt their blood relatives. 86 The extended black family
National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees survey that showed the percentage of 100% payout
plans to be 57% in the trustee region of Tennessee and Kentucky).
84. See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 26 (arguing that bankruptcy laws combined with
state exemption laws give financially strapped households an incentive to increase their
mortgage debt).
85. ROBERT B. HILL, THE STRENGTHS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES: TwENTY-FivE
YEARS LATER 126 (1999); ROSEM. KREIDER, U.S. DEPT. OFCOMMERCE,AooPTEDCHILDREN
AND STEPCHILDREN: 2000, at 3, 9, & 13-15 (2003).
86. See LYNNE M. CASPER & KENNETH R. BRYSON, CO-RESIDENT GRANDPARENTS AND
THEIR GRANDCHILDREN: GRANDPARENT MAiNTAINED FAMILIES ( 1998), at http://www .census.gov
/populationlwww/documentationltwps0026/twps0026.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2004)
(suggesting "increased drug abuse among parents, teen pregnancy, divorce, child abuse and
neglect" as well as AIDS and increased incarceration rates contribute to increase in grandparentmaintained households) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Most adoption agencies give priority to families that have two parents and no children, are
in the American middle-income bracket, and are relatively young. Given this profile, black
grandparents or family members who serve as principle caregivers may find it hard to adopt
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typically expands beyond blood relatives and includes "fictive kin"-unrelated
individuals who may "provide more family support services than blood kin. "87
Because of these fictive kinships, black children often are adopted informally
and reared by surrogate parents who are not related biologically to the
children. 88
Significant racial disparities also exist in households that consist of
spouses or parents with children. That is, though the number of black families
has increased over the last thirty years, black households have higher
"nontraditional" (non-husband-wife) family living arrangements. There are
considerably more white married-couple families than minority married-couple
families. 89 For example, while there were 4.9 million black families in 1970,
and 8.7 million by 2000, less than half (48%) of those families consisted of
married couples, a significant decline from the 68% of black married-couple
households in 1970.90 Similarly, while the number of Hispanic families
dramatically increased, from 2 million in 1970 to 7.6 million in 2000, and 68%
of those families were married couples in 2000, the percentage of married
Hispanic couples also significantly declined from 81% in 1970. Since 1970,
the number of white families also increased, from 46.2 million to 60 million in
2000. While the percentage of married white couples declined as well, from
89% in.1970 to 81% in 2000, the decline was a much smallerpercentage. 91 In
because of the racial marriage gap, the higher black fertility rates, and the fact that blacks tend to
live in lower income households. HILL, supra note 85, at 127-28.
87. HILL, supra note 85, at 128.
88. /d.
89. JESSE McKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, at 3
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-541.pdf.
90. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL.ABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES: No. 70 FAMILY
AND NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOWS, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND TYPE: 1970-1994 (1995)
[hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 70),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/llgen/95statab/pop.pdf; U.S. CENsus BUREAu, FAMILY
HOUSEHOWS, BY TYPE, AGE OF OWN CHIWREN, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, AND RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN OF HOUSEHOWER (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/ socdemolhh-fam/p20-53712000/tabF2. pdf.
91. U.S.CENSUSBUREAU,STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES: No. 10,supra
note 90; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, CuRRENTPOPULATIONREP0RT, P20537: TBL. F2, FAMILY HOUSEHOWS, BY TYPE, AGE OF OWN CHIWREN, EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT, AND RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN OF HOUSEHOWER: MARCH 2000 (2000)
[hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, P20-537: TABLE F2], available at http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemolhh-fam/p20-53 712000/tabF2.pdf.
Black women at all education and income levels are more likely than whites to be nevermarried mothers and also are more likely to be never married (whether or not mothers) than
their white or Hispanic counterparts. ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS
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short, while more minority households exist now than in 1970, the racial
marriage gap between whites and Hispanics and blacks has actually widened.
The number of single-headed households has also increased, especially
black female-headed households. 92 Currently, almost half of all black
households are headed by females-not surprising given the racial marriage
gap, the higher minority fertility rates, and the increased incidence of divorce
generally. 93 Many single-headed households are entitled to financial
assistance from the noncustodial parent, though not all custodial parents who
are awarded financial support actually receive it. A racial gap exists among
those people who receive family support payments. That is, out of the total
population that received child support in 2002, 67% were white, 19% were
African-American, and 12% were Hispanic. 94 While these percentages are
roughly comparable to the percentage of those racial groups in the overall
population in the United States, a larger proportion of minority (especially
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P70-80: NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 8 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.sipp.census.gov/
sipp/p70s/ p70-80.pdf; David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent
Families in the United States since 1960, at 12 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/inequality/Seminar/Papers/EiwdJnck.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
92. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
P20-547: UNMARRIED-COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, BY PRESENCE OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT
(June 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemolhh-farn/tabUC-l.pdf; see
also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 70, supra note
90 (showing the increase of Black female-headed households from 1970 to 1994). While blacks
account for 15% of all children, they are 34% ofthe children offemale-headed family groups.
TERRY LUGAILA & JUUA OVERTURF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS:
CHILDREN AND THE HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIVE IN: 2000, at 14 (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-14.pdf. The number of single mothers with
children grew nearly five times faster in the 1990s than the number of married couples with
children. Jonathan Rauch, The Widening Marriage Gap: America's New Class Divide, 2001
NAT'L J. 1471, 1471; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, P20-547: LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD:
1960 TO PRESENT (June 2003) (listing statistics for two-parent and female-headed households in
the 1990s), available at http://www .census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-farn/tabCH-1. pdf.
93. Currently 52% of all black families are headed by a single parent and 44% of all black
households are headed by women. CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, P20-537: TABLEF2, supra
note 91. In contrast, only 23% of Hispanic households are headed by women and even fewer
white (14%) and Asian (13%) households have female heads. ld.; see also Reynolds Farley,
Demographic, Economic, and Social Trends in a Multicultural America, in NEW DIRECTIONS:
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN ADIVERSIFYING NATION 11, 13-20 (James S. Jackson ed., Nat' I Policy
Ass'n 2002) (noting that black women have higher fertility rates than white women and that
more whites are married than blacks).
94. TIMOTHY S. GRAU.., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENTPOPULATIONREP0RTS,P60-225:
CUSTODIAL MOTHERS ANDFATHERSANDTiiEIRCHILDSUPPORT: 2001, at4 (Oct. 2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-225.pdf.
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black) than white households are single-headed or unmarried-partner
households. 95 As white, non-Hispanic custodial parents are more likely than
black or Hispanic custodial parents to receive child-support payments, the gap
is striking. 96
The numbers of people receiving alimony also varies dramatically by race.
While the marriage (and divorce) rates differ by race, the marriage and divorce
gaps are not as pronounced as the alimony gap. That is, out of the total
population receiving alimony in 2000, 90% were white, 7% African-American,
and 4% Hispanic. 97 While black women had a higher divorce rate (12%) than
white women (10%) and Hispanic women (8.3%), white women receive
alimony in a percentage (91%) that is slightly higher relative to their percentage
(89%) in the overall U.S. population.98
Though blacks and Hispanics have relatively higher fertility rates than
other groups, black children are more likely to live with neither of their parents

95. See TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000
SPECIAL REPoRTS: MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 6
(2003) (showing that in 2000, the percent of white unmarried opposite-sex partner households
(7.3%) was less than half the percentage for black (15.5%) and American Indian (16%)
households), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. The number of
unmarried-partner households has increased both due to the increase in self-identified gay and
lesbian households and because of the increase in opposite-sex couples who choose to live
together before marriage. /d. at I.
96. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, STATISTICALABSTRACTOF
THE UNITED STATES: No. 513, NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH INCOME BY SPECIFIED SOURCES OF
INCOME: 2000, at 342 (2002) (hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: No.
513] (setting forth the number of white, black, and Hispanic persons receiving child support),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/socinsur.pdf with U.S. CENsus
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES 2003: No.
13, REsiDENT POPULATION BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND AGE: 2000 AND 2002 (2003) (setting
forth the 2002 population numbers by race and Hispanic Origin). Though white non-Hispanic
custodial parents receive child-support payments in a percentage (79%) that is lower than their
percentage in the overall U.S. population (80%), and black custodial parents actually receive
child-support payments in a percentage (18%) that is higher than their percentage in the U.S.
population (16%), Hispanic custodial parents receive a much lower percentage (9%) of childsupport payments than their relative percentage (16%) in the U.S. population.
97. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 513, supra note 96, at 342.
98. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, CURRENTPOPULATIONREPoRT,
P20-537, TaL. A1,MARITALSTATUSOFPEOPLE 15 YEARS ANDOVER, BY AGE, SEX, PERSONAL
EARNINGS, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: MARCH 2000 (2000) (showing that, as of March 2000,
10.2% of white women were divorced, 8.3% of Hispanic women were divorced, and 11.8% of
black women were divorced), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hhfam/p20-537/2000/tabAl.pdf; STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES: No. 513, supra
note 96, at 342 (showing that the percentage of white women receiving alimony is slightly
greater than the percentage of white women in the overall U.S. population).
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(9%) than white and Asian children (3%) or Hispanic children (5%). 99
However, of all children who live with someone other than their parents, black
children are less likely (9%) to live with nonrelatives than white (27% ), Asian
(14%), or Hispanic children (23%), and many now appear to live with their
grandparents. 100 Indeed, the number of grandparent-headed households has
increased dramatically over the last thirty years, and the number of children
living in grandparent-headed households increased 30% from 1990 to 2000. 101
Research suggests that 17% of black grandparents have children living in their
home, but only 5% of white grandparents have children living in their home. 102
Black and Hispanic children also are more likely to live in intergenerational
households (parent, child, grandchild) or in households headed by relatives who
are not their parents. While 6% of all children in households lived in
grandparent-headed households and the largest number of children who live in
grandparent-headed households are white, higher percentages of minority
children live in grandparent-headed households. 103 For example, blacks
represent 15% of all children but represent 32% of all children who lived with
grandparents and 29% of all children who lived with other relatives in 2001. 104
Similarly, while only 17% of all children are Hispanic, 21% of children living
with grandparents and 38% of all children living with other relatives are
Hispanic. 105 Indeed, a recent report notes that Hispanic children as a group,
99. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, CURRENTPOPULATIONREI'oRT,
P20-537, TBL. C2, HOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIP AND LMNG ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER
18 YEARS, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND MEIROPOLITAN REsiDENCE: MARCH 2000
(2000) (listing statistics for living arrangements of children under age 18 for each race),
available at http://www .census.gov/population/socdemolhh-fam/p20-37/2000/tab C2.pdf.
100. See id. (listing statistics for living arrangements of children under age 18 for each
race). Black children were also the least likely to live with both parents. Out of all black
children under 18, 38% lived with both parents, compared to 75% of white children, 81% of
Asian children, and 65% of Hispanic children. /d. Stated differently, while blacks account for
15% of all children, they represent 30% of all children who live with neither parent. LUGAllA &
OVERTURF, supra note 92, at 14.
101. CASPER & BRYSON, supra note 86, at *1; KNOWLEDGE MGMT. & THE AARP
GRANDPARENT INFO. CTR., AARP, LEAN ON ME: SUPPORT AND MINORITY OUTREACH FOR
GRANDPARENTS RAISING GRANDCHILDREN 7 (rev. Dec. 2003) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE MGMT. &
THE AARP GRANDPARENT INFO. CTR.], available at http://research.aarp.org/generall
gp_2003_a.pdf.
102. CURTDAVIES&DAMEKA WILUAMS,AARP, THEGRANDPARENTSTUDY2002REPoRT3
(2002), available at http://research.aarp.org/generallgp_2002.pdf.
103. LUGAILA & OVERTURF, supra note 92, at 2; KNOWLEDGE MGMT. & THE AARP
GRANDPARENT INFO. CTR., supra note 101, at 7.
104. LUGAILA & OVERTURF, supra note 92, at 7.
105. ·ld. at 7-9. A recent study indicates that 13.2% of black, 7.8% of Hispanic, but only
4.2% of Caucasian children live in grandparent-headed households. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. & THE
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followed closely by black children, are the fastest growing segment of children
living in grandparent-headed households. 106
Given the increase in single-parent households, the economic hardships
single-parent households face, 107 and the increase in grandparent-headed
households, it is not surprising that 52% of all grandparents appear to spend
money on their grandchildren's educational needs, 45% help pay for their
living expenses, and 25% help pay medical expenses. 108 Grandparents spend,
on average, $500 per year on their grandchildren, and 33% of grandparents
spend between $500 and $2500 on their grandchildren annually. 109 It is unclear
whether minority grandparents provide proportionately more financial support
than other grandparents. However, since black grandparents are more likely
than white grandparents to be the primary caregivers of their grandchildren or
to have a grandchild live in their home, they likely spend relatively more on
their grandchildren even if they have no legal duty to provide this support. 110
Likewise, one study suggests that although the black, American Indian, and
Hispanic populations have the same percent of people age thirty and over who
live with their grandchildren (8% ), blacks are more likely than Hispanics to be
responsible for those grandchildren. 111
AARPGRANDPARENTINFO. CTR., supra note 101, at 7.
106. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. & THE AARP GRANDPARENT INFO. CTR., supra note 101, at 8.
107. Children who live only with their mothers are almost five times as likely to live in
poverty as children who live in a married-couple household. LUGAIIA & OVERTURF, supra note
92, at 16. Indeed, families with a female head represent 60% of all families in poverty.
Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 91, at 2. Children raised in single-parent homes also are more
likely to dropout of school, to have higher delinquency and teen pregnancy rates, and to have
higher unemployment rates as adults. These issues disproportionately affect blacks though
marital status rather than race may be the most important factor. Children who live in a motheronly household are more likely to be poor than children who live in a black or white two-parent
household. In other words, children are better off financially if they live with married black
parents rather than a single parent of any race. Id. at 4; BERNADE'ITE D. PROCTOR & JosEPH
DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS, P60-222: POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 23-25 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf.
108. DAVIES & WILLIAMs, supra note 102, at 33.
109. ld. at 36.
110. Robert Joseph Taylor et al., Developments in Research on Black Families: A Decade
Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 993,998 (1990) (observing that a racial comparison of "the
grandparent role reveal[s] that, in comparison to whites, black grandparents take a more active
part in the parenting of grandchildren").
111. TAVIA SIMMONS & JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF:
GRANDPARENTS LNING WITH GRANDCHILDREN: 2000, at 2-3 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-31.pdf. These statistics suggest that Hispanic
grandparents may be the economically dependent member of intergenerational households. Id.
at 3. This study also found that Asian co-resident grandparents were the least likely to be
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Finally, black and Hispanic adults are more likely than whites to provide
financial support to their parents, other nonnuclear relatives, and fictive kin. 112
Census data indicate that Hispanics are the most likely group to provide
financial support to people both inside and outside their households, followed
by blacks and then whites. 113 In addition, recent studies suggest that more
blacks than whites expect to support their adult children and aging parents. 114

2. Employment
A racial gap also exists in unemployment and employment rates. 115
Blacks have higher unemployment rates than whites and Hispanics, and the
level of black unemployment is rising at a faster pace than it has since the
responsible for their grandchildren. ld.
112. See Taylor et al., supra note 110, at 997 (observing that "among blacks, the relative
contributions of a wife, adult children, and non-nuclear relatives constitute a greater portion of
the total household income than is the case among whites"); see also Hyoun K. Kim & Patrick
C. McKenry, Social Networks and Support: A Comparison of African Americans, Asian
Americans, Caucasians, and Hispanics, 29 J. COMP. FAM. L. 313,315-17 (1998) (discussing
support provided to fictive kin in African-American and Hispanic communities).
113. WILfRED T. MASUMURA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CuRRENT POPULATION REPoRTS, P7084: WHO'S HELPING OUT? fiNANCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS AMONG AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS:
1997, at 2 (2002), available at http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70s/p70-84.pdf.
114. ARGOSY REsEARCH, THEARIELMUTUALFuNDs/CHARLESSCHWAB&Co.,lNC.BLACK
INVESTOR SURVEY: SAVING AND INVESTING AMONG HIGH INCOME AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND
WHITE AMERICANS, slide 7, at http://www.arielmutualfunds.com/forms/2003-survey/Black%
20Investor%20Survey%202003_files/frame.htm (2003) [hereinafter BLACK INvESTOR SURVEY]
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Kim & McKenry, supra note 112,
at 328-29 (suggesting that whites are Jess likely to rely on children for support because of the
Anglo view that adults should give assistance to, not accept assistance from, children).
115. See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY
AsKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.bls.gov/gps/gpsfaqs.htm#Q2 (last modified May 26, 2004)
(defining unemployed persons as all persons who had no employment during the reference
week, were available for work (except for temporary illness and including those waiting to be
recalled to a job from which they had been laid off), and had made specific efforts to find
employment some time during the four-week period ending with the reference week; defining
employed persons as all persons who, during the reference week, (a) did any work as paid
employees, worked in their own business or profession or on their own farm, or worked fifteen
hours or more as unpaid workers in an enterprise operated by a member of their family, or
(b) were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent; and limiting
unemployment and employment statistics to persons sixteen years of age and older residing in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia, who are not inmates of institutions-for example,
penal and mental facilities, homes for the aged-and who are not on active duty in the Armed
Forces) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Given the proportionately higher
number of black males who are incarcerated, the unemployment gap between black and white
men is likely much higher than the figures reported by the government.
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mid-1970s. 116 In fact, the black-white unemployment rate gap has actually
increased slightly over the last thirty years. In 1972, blacks had just over
twice the unemployment rate of whites ( 10.4% black compared to 5.1%
white) but that gap widened by 2003 (10.8% black compared to 5.2%
white). 117 Hispanics also have a higher unemployment rate than whites, but
the Hispanic unemployment rate is lower than the black unemployment
rates. 118 The black unemployment rate likely is higher than the
unemployment rate of other races because blacks have been more heavily
concentrated in the manufacturing industry, which has been especially
affected by the global outsourcing of U.S. jobs. 119 Except possibly for
workers who have advanced degrees, this black-white unemployment gap
exists at all educational levels. 120 Indeed, a recent speech by the Chairman
116. Louis Uchitelle, Blacks Lose Better Jobs Faster as Middle-Class Work Drops, N.Y.
TiMES, Jul. 12, 2003, at Al.
117. DEDRICK MUHAMMAD ET AL., UNITED FOR FAIR ECONOMY, THE STATE OF THE DREAM
2004, at 4 (Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter STATEOFTHEDREAM] (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment Situation Historical Table A-2), available at http://www.faireconomy.org/press/
2004/StateoftheDream2004.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Census
Bureau information also indicates that white unemployment rates (3%) are significantly lower
than minority unemployment rates. Native Americans have the highest unemployment rates
(7.6%), followed by blacks (6.9%), Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders (6.7%), and
Hispanics (5.5%). SANDRALUCKETTCi..ARK&MAIWEISMANll..E, U.S.CENsusBUREAU,CENSUS
2000 BRIEF:
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:
2000, at 5 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-18.pdf.
118. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNuAL
AVERAGES: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVIUAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY AGE,
SEX, AND RACE (2000), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requestsnf/aa2002/
pdf/cpsaat3.pdf; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA
ANNUAL AVERAGES: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE HISPANIC-ORIGIN POPULATION BY AGE AND
SEX (2002), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requestsnf/aa2002/pdf/cpsaat4.pdf.
119. Stephanie Armour, Job Hunt Gets Harder for African-Americans, USA TODAY.COM,
Dec. 9, 2000, at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/employment/2002-12-08-jobless_x.
htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jane Birnbaum, American Jobs:
Going, Going ... , at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/magazine /0903_amjobs.cfm (2004)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dianna Solis, African-Americans being
Hun Most by Joblessness, at http://www.ccmacanada.org/ccmalnews_roorn/new_articles/
july2003/joblessness.htm (July 27, 2003) (noting that Hispanic workers have not been as
affected as black workers by global outsourcing because they are more concentrated in the
service industry and construction, areas that have fared well in the current economy) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNuAL
AVERAGES: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVIUAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 25 YEARS
AND OVER BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, SEX, RACE, AND HisPANIC ORIGIN (2000), available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requestsnf/aa2002/pdf/cpsaat7 .pdf. But see STATEOFTHE DREAM,
supra note 117, at 7 (suggesting that, relative to a white counterpart with the same educational
level, a black worker with a high school education will earn $300,000 less than his white
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of Fannie Mae indicated racial equality in the job market would mean
nearly two million more professional and managerial jobs for African
121
.
A mencans.

3. Income
Not surprisingly, the racial employment gap creates a racial income
gap. Incomes for whites are substantially higher than incomes for all other
groups. 122 The income gap for blacks and whites has actually increased
since the late 1960s. 123 For example, the median household income for all
races was $42,000 in 2002. 124 The median income of $45,000 for white
households is higher than the $33,000 median income for Hispanic
households and significantly higher than the $29,000 median black
counterpart, will earn $500,000 less if he graduates from college, and will earn $600,000 less on
average if he has an advanced degree).
121. Franklin D. Raines, Remarks at Black Student Fund, at www.fanniernae.com/media/
speeches/index.jhtml?p=Media&s=Executive+Speeches (Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Raines
Speech] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. REs. BuLL., Jan. 2003, at 1, 3 [hereinafter
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2003/0103lead.pdf.
123. See STATE OF THE DREAM, supra note 117, at 7 (noting that the typical blackfamily in
1968 had 60% of the income of a white family but had only 58% of that income in 2002). The
employment gap also creates disparities in health care coverage. As 64% of people in the
United States have employment-based health insurance plans, being employed remains the
strongest link to health insurance coverage for the American worker. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATIONPROfll.EOFTHEUNITEDSTATES: 2000(1NTERNETRELEAsE) 15-1 (2000),available
at http://www .census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/chap 15 .pdf. The number of Americans
without health insurance in 2002 increased to 43.6 million, or 15.2% of the total population, up
2.4 million from 2001. RoBERTJ.MILLS&SHEILESHBHANDARI, U.S.CENsusBUREAu,HEALm
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2002, at 4 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf. Part of this increase can be explained by a
large drop in job-based coverage. 1d. Because the likelihood of being insured increases as the
level of education and income rises, not surprisingly, minorities have higher rates of
uninsurance.1d. at 4-7 (explaining that those in poverty have a higher uninsured rate and that
"the likelihood of being insured increases as the level of education rises"). See generally
SHEILESH BHANDARI & ROBERT MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF EcONOMIC WELLBEING: HEALTH INSURANCE 1996-1999 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003
pubs/p70-92.pdf (reporting on the dynamics of health insurance). While the percentage of all
people without health insurance is 15%, the white uninsurance rate is 14% while Hispanics had
the highest percentage of uninsureds at 32%, followed by blacks at 20%, and Asian and Pacific
Islanders at 18%. 1d. at 6.
124. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2002 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubslp60-22l.pdf.
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household income. 125 In addition, blacks are more likely to live below the
poverty level (23.6%) than are whites (7.7%) and are more likely to earn
less than $25,000 (40%) than whites (17 .8% ). 126 In contrast, twice the
number of white workers (31.6%) earn more than $75,000 annually
compared to black workers ( 15.6% ). 127 While black and Hispanic incomes
lag white median household incomes, Asian households (especially native-born
households) have higher median incomes ($52,000) than white households. 128
Some attribute these higher household incomes to this racial group's relatively
higher educational attainment rates and work hours, especially for the female
household members. 129
Black household income is likely lower than other racial groups' income
because blacks have lower marriage rates and higher percentages of femaleheaded households, both of which decrease household income. 130 Black and
Hispanic households also have fewer households headed by college graduates,
which also decreases household income. 131 There has been some progress,
however, in black household income. For example, the black-white income
gap closes somewhat when married-couple households are considered, the gap
between female workers is less than the gap between male workers, and there
has been an increase in the number of black rnillionaires. 132 However, the gap
stubbornly persists at all income levels, black poverty levels have not radically

125. ld.
126. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BLACKPOPULATIONINTHEU.S.,MARCH2000, TBL.15,16, at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/ppl-142.html (2001) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. ld.
128. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 124, at 3.
129. James S. Jackson & Nicholas A. Jones, New Directions in Thinking About Race in
America: African Americans in a Diversifying Nation, 7 AFR. AM. REs. PERSPS. 1, 9 (2001).
130. For example, the median income in 2002 for married-couple families was $61,254
while the median income for female households was $29,001. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra
note 124, at 9.
131. See infra Part V (discussing the relationship between education and income).
132. See Farley, supra note 93, at 28 (noting an increase in the number of black
millionaires); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 65, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS-PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY
INCOME LEVEL, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN ,IN CONSTANT (2000) DoLLARS: 1980-2000 (2002)
(showing an increase in the number of black millionaires), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/income.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: No. 655, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDSMEDIAN INCOME AND INCOME LEVEL BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE: 2000 (2002) (showing that the gap
narrows for married couples and that the gap for female workers is narrower than that for male
workers), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02sta tab/income. pdf.
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changed in the last thirty years, and there has never been a time period where
the majority of blacks have been middle-income. 133 One study notes that it took
more than three decades-from 1968 to 2001-for blacks to close the blackwhite income gap by two cents (from $.55 to $.57) and, at this rate, it will take
another 581 years for blacks to fully close the income gap. 134 In addition,
recent Fannie Mae data suggest that but for the income gap, blacks would have
nearly $200 billion more in income. 135

4. Wealth
a. Overall
Individuals who have wealth are generally better off than those with
income because the ability to reduce wealth to cash can protect individuals
from income interruptions and can help the individual (or their children or other
family members) buy a home, start a business, or pay for college. 136 Stated
differently, while income affects a person's ability to purchase things in the
present, wealth (or the lack thereof) affects a person's ability to provide a
present and future financial cushion for himself and his heirs. 137 Because
wealth is distributed among households far more unevenly than income, the
racial wealth gap is even more profound and persistent than the income gap. 138
133. See Farley, supra note 93, at 28 (noting that "[t]here has never been a period when the
majority of Blacks were members of America's middle economic class").
134. STATEOFTHEDREAM, supra note 117, at 6.
135. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
136. Wealth may vary somewhat from year to year depending on the increase or decrease in
value of the assets that constitute that wealth. Nonetheless, wealth tends to be more stable
within families and across generations than income, and, unlike income, an occupation, or an
education, it is more likely to be inherited rather than earned. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK,
LIVING IN THE RED 14 ( 1999).
137. With wealth, a person can avoid or weather a financial setback because she can either
sell, exchange, or pledge those assets as collateral for a loan. See generally JOHN KARL ScHOlZ
& KARA LEVINE, U.S. BLACK-WHITE WEALTH INEQUALITY: A SURVEY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.russellsage.org/programs/proj_ reviews/si/revscholzlevine01.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. Indeed, eliminating the racial wealth disparity has been cited as a justification for
providing reparations to blacks. Because whites reaped financial benefits from a system that
allowed them to avoid paying wages to slaves, they were able to obtain wealth and to bequeath
that wealth to their descendants. Moreover, though owning slaves did impose some financial
costs on slave owners (minimal food, clothing, and shelter), the financial costs to slaves were
significantly greater because they were deprived of wage income, were legally prohibited from
owning property, and thus were prevented from accumulating wealth or passing that wealth on
to their descendants. See Dalton Conley, The Cost of Slavery, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at
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At all income levels, white households have significantly more real and
personal property than black or Hispanic households. While the median
household net worth for all groups in 2000 was $55,000, the median net worth of
black households was $7,500 and was $9,750 for Hispanic households. 139 Black
and Hispanic median household net worth is dramatically less than the $79,400
median net worth for white households. 140 Moreover, excluding home
ownership, the median net worth of all households in 2000 was $13,473, but
whites had a higher median net worth of $22,566 when compared to blacks
$1,166 and Hispanics $1,850. 141 For families in the lowest earning quintile, the
gap is even more profound. While overall median net worth (including home
equity) for this income group was $7,396, white families had a median net worth
142
of $24,000, compared to $57 for black families and $500 for Hispanic families.
The percentage of black households reporting zero or negative net worth is almost
twice the rate of white households. 143 This gap no doubt contributes to the
significantly higher poverty rates of blacks (24%) and Hispanics (22%) relative to
their percentages of the overall population ( 13% black, 14% Hispanic) and to the
percentage of whites (8%) and all people who live in poverty (12% ). 144
The racial disparity at the upper level is perhaps even more striking. The
total median net worth for households in the highest earning quintile was

A25 (discussing the economic issues of slavery and reparations). See generally MELVIN L.
0UVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECllVE ON
RAciAL INEQUALITY (1995); Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol & Shelbi D. Day, Property,
Wealth, Inequality and Human Rights: A Formula for Reform, 341No. L. REv. 1213 (2001).
139. SHAWNA ORZECHOWSKI & PETER SEPIEW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND
ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 1998 AND 2000 CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS 6, 12
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p70-88.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 13. The racial wealth gap among homeowners likely is caused by segregated
housing patterns and the generally lower market value placed on homes in predominantly
minority neighborhoods. This gap likely will not close until neighborhoods become less
segregated and minorities own homes in neighborhoods that have appreciating housing stock.
See generally GEORGE S. MASNICK, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, HOME OWNERSHIP TRENDS AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE
20TH CENTURY (2001) (hereinafter HOME OWNERSHIP TRENDs AND RACIAL INEQUALITY),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publicationslhome ownershiplmasnick_wO 1-4.pdf (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIEW, supra note 139, at 12.
143. WOLFF, supra note 81, at 21; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AsSET OWNERSHIP OF
HousEHOLDS: 2000, TBL. 4 (2004), at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/1998_2000/
wlth00-4.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (showing that 29% of black households had zero or
negative net worth compared to only 12.7% of white households) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
144. PROCTOR & DALAKER, supra note 107, at 2 tbl. l.
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$185,500. White families had a higher median net worth of$208,023, while
black family net worth ($65, 141) and Hispanic family net worth ($73,032) trail
significantly. 145 In fact, the net worth of black and Hispanic college graduates
is comparable to the net worth of white high school graduates while black and
Hispanic high school graduates' net worth is comparable to the net worth of
white high school dropouts. 146 Though the wealth gap appears to be closing
somewhat, one study projected that it would take almost 100 years for black
households to reach parity with whites. 147

b. Real Property
Homeownership constitutes the largest component of household net worth
(or wealth) for all populations in the United States-except the highest income
groups-and arguably is the safest and most efficient way both to provide
physical shelter and the to shelter the homeowner from financial vicissitudes
of life. 148 More than 68% of total households owned their own homes in
2002. 149 There is, again, a significant racial disparity. Homeownership
rates for whites in 2002 was almost 75% while the ownership rates for
blacks was less than 49%. 150 The homeownership rates for other
145. ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIEW, supra note 139, at 6.
146. ScHOlZ & LEVINE, supra note 137, at 3.
147. STATEOFTHEDREAM, supra note 117, at8; cJ. Press Release, Consumer Federation of
America, More African-Americans Save and Begin to Close Wealth Gap (Oct. 29, 2003)
(explaining that, according to an analysis of the most recent Federal Reserve Survey of
Consumer Finances data by an Ohio State professor, there has been a 221% increase in net
wealth of African-American households from 1989 to 2001 but only a 32.9% increase in overall
U.S. households), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/102903blackamsaves.pdf (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. HOME OWNERSHIP TRENDS AND RACIAL lNEQUAUTY, supra note 141, at 10, 20-22.
Owning a home theoretically should give homeowners greater protection against economic
misfortunes because a debtor who has equity in a home can use that equity to pay living
expenses and reduce existing debt. This appears to be the case for white homeowners, as a
smaller percentage of white homeowners file for bankruptcy than white renters. Elizabeth
Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1773, 1782-86 (2004). In contrast, blacks increase their risk of filing for
bankruptcy by becoming homeowners. Thus, unlike white homeowners, a greater percentage of
black homeowners file for bankruptcy than black renters. Id.
149. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARv. UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 6
http://jchs.
(2003) [hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING], available at
harvard.edu/publicationslmarkets/son2004.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
150. Id. at 35; see also Aizcorbe, supra note 122, at 19 (reporting that67.7% of all families
and 74.1% of white families owned their own homes but or!ly 47% of nonwhite or Hispanic
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minority groups also lag the white homeownership rate, with Hispanics
having a 47% rate, Asians a 54% rate, and Native Americans having rates
which range from 33% to 55%. 151 While blacks and Hispanics are less likely to
be homeowners, they are more likely to have more mortgage debt than
whites. 152
While the majority of white households have owned their homes since the
end of World War II, most minority groups still have not yet reached this level.
Indeed, though the increase in household ownership during the 1990s resulted
from concerted efforts to bolster minority home ownership rates, 153 the home
ownership rate for blacks increased by almost 6% from 1993-2003, and
Hispanic ownership rates increased by more than 7% during that ten-year
period, there is still a significant racial homeownership gap which has remained
constant since the 1980s. 154 One study has projected that these homeownership
rates would not achieve parity until the year 3666 at the current rate. 155
families did); MENNA DEMESSIE, CNILRIGHTS.ORG, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE REPoRTS RACIAL
DISPARITIES CONTINUE, at http://civilrights.org/issues/housing/details.cfm?id=9727 (July 30,
2002) (reporting that 48% of blacks own their homes compared to a 74% ownership rate for
whites) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
151. FANNIE MAE, AMERICAN DREAM COMMITMENT 8 (2002) (stating that homeownership
rates for Native Americans range between 33% and 55%), available at http://www.fannie
mae.cornlinitiati ves/pdf/adc/full2002.pdf; STATE OF THE NATION's HousiNG, supra note 149, at
35 (showing that homeownership rates for Hispanic and Asian/Other ethnic groups are 47.4%
and 53.8% respectively); see also Press Release, National American Indian Housing Council,
Native American Homeownership: Far Below Other Americans; But Mortgage Default Data
Shown As Less Risky (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://naihc. indian.cornlpr/mortgage-data-ll-02.html
(explaining that the Native-American homeownership rate of 40.7% lags behind the 47.1% rate
for African Americans and 47.2% rate for Hispanics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
152. See generally Bahchieva et a!., supra note 8, at 8 (discussing data that indicate
families with children and single parents have more mortgage debt than families without
children).
153. GEORGES.MAsNICK,JOINTCTR.roRHOUS. STUDIESOFHARV. UNN., UNDERSTANDING
THE MINORITY CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. OWNER HOUSEHOLD GROWTH 3 ( 1998) (explaining that
recent economic trends and innovative mortgage lending initiatives that target minorities
partially explains minority owner growth in the 1990s).
154. STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING, supra note 149, at 35; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES OWNERSHIP RATES, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
wwwlhousing/census/historic/ownrate.htrnl (last modified Aug. 20, 2004) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
155. See STATEOFTHEDREAM, supra note 117, at 14 (noting parity would be achieved in
1664 years); see also SuwvAN, supra note 1, at 231 (indicating that minorities show "no sign
of making up the [homeownership] gap"). For example, while home equity makes up 32% of
the total net worth of all households, it is much greater than that in Hispanic households (51%)
and almost double that amount in black households (62%). In contrast, home equity makes up
only 31% of white household net worth. ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIEW, supra note 139, at 15.
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Lower minority homeownership rates may be attributable to several
factors. On average minority households tend to be younger than their white
counterparts. Because homeownership rates rise with age, minority
homeownership rates may lag white rates because of the lower average age of
minority heads of household. 156 In addition, the lower marriage rate among
black households, the higher percentage of Hispanic and Asian recent
immigrant households, and the higher fertility rates for blacks and Hispanics
also likely suppress overall minority homeownership rates. 157
The
concentration of Asians, and to a lesser extent Hispanics and blacks, in
metropolitan areas with relatively high housing costs may also depress both
minority homeownership rates and the value of their homes. 158 Moreover,
because median income and, as discussed in the next Part, average educational
attainment rates for black and Hispanics households remain lower than for nonHispanic whites, this too likely contributes to the homeownership gap because
homeownership rates rise with income and educational attainment rates. 159
Racial discrimination also plays (and has always played) a role in
homeownership patterns and rates. Although recent federal housing policy
aimed to correct the imbalances in homeownership rates, 160 early federal
156. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, supra note 154; SUlliVAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 232; see also
McKINNoN, supra note 89, at 2-3 (discussing the proportionately younger black population).
157. See MARK 0UDA & ERIC S. BELSKY, JOINT CENTER roR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, THE ANATOMY OFlHE LoW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP BOOM IN 1HE 1990s, at 8 (200 1)
(discussing studies that attribute lower ownership rates to immigrant status, age, fertility rates, and
dispersal in high-cost urban areas), available at http://wwwjchs.harvard.edu//publicationslhome
ownershiplliho01-l.pdf; SWARTS. ROSENTIIAL, JOINT Cm. roR Hous. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV.,
EUMINATING CREDIT BARRIERS To INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP: How FAR CAN WE Go? 22 (2001)
(suggesting black homeownership rates would increase by 5.55 percentage points if the black marital
status equaled that of the white population), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
homeownershipllihoO 1-3.pdf.
158. DuoA&Bru;KY,supranote 157,at8(notingthatHispanicsandAsiansareunevenlydispersed
in metropolitan areas throughout the United States); see also McKINNoN, supra note 89, at 2 (noting that
blacks are more than twice as likely (51%) to live inside a metropolitan central city than whites (21%)).
159. See U.S.CENsusBUREAU,HlsroRICALCENsusoFHousiNGTABIES0wNERsHIPRA1FS, supra
note 154 (showing, for example, while the homeownership rate in 2000 was 87.1% for high-income
households, that rate was only 46.2% for low-income households); see also ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIElll,
supra note 139, at 15 (comparing levels of wealth and asset ownership with various socioeconomic
factors such as income and race).
160. Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 11 (discussing incentives the government provides to lenders
to encourage them to loan to lower and middle income households). For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the FHA all adopted initiatives designed to increase homeownership generally and minority
homeownership specifically. These initiatives included lowering down payment requirements,
recognizing multiple income sources to qualify for a housing loan, providing loan documentation in
Spanish, and conducting fair housing audits of lender practices to combat realtors and lenders' racially
discriminatory marlreting and lending practices. HoME OwNERsHIP TRFNDs AND RACIAL INEQUALITY,
supra note 141,at7-8.
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housing policies, especially underwriting policies of the Federal Housing
Administration, officially sanctioned racial "redlining" by discouraging lenders
from making loans to nonwhite neighborhoods and questioning the stability of
white neighborhoods that were integrated. 161 Even today, minorities are more
likely to be rejected for home mortgages than white applicants after controlling
for virtually all of the risk factors lenders consider in the underwriting
process. 162 Likewise, blacks and Hispanics experience less favorable treatment
more often than whites before they apply for loans and receive less information
about financing their home purchases. 163 While minorities are receiving more
conventional loans than they did twenty years ago, conventional lenders still
provide proportionately fewer loans to low or moderate income neighborhoods,
which forces minorities and lower income homebuyers to rely heavily on the
164
subprime, high-interest loan market to finance their home purchases.
Other factors that depress minority home ownership rates include
exclusionary zoning and other "smart growth" policies that state and local
jurisdictions use to manage growth and preserve undeveloped land. 165 These
161. Redlining was a practice whereby banks coded minority neighborhoods "red," the
lowest possible rating, which effectively made it impossible for blacks to get a mortgage since
most neighborhoods were (and remain) racially segregated. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note
138, at 18-19 (discussing the guidance provided by the Federal Housing Administration to
appraisers).
162. See Jackson & Jones, supra note 129, at lO-ll (discussing a recent study that found
blacks in the Boston area more likely to be turned down for federal mortgages than whites of
similar backgrounds); see also ScHOlZ & LEVINE, supra note 137, at 41 (stating that "blacks are
almost twice as likely to be rejected for a loan"); Paul Gores, Study Finds Major Racial Gap in
Home Lending, White Lending, MILWAUKEE]. SENTINEL, Oct 2, 2002, at Dl (finding blacks 5.6
times more likely to be turned down for mortgage loan); No Excuse for Biased Lending, ST.
Louis DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 2002, at B6 (finding the gap between minority and nonminority
rejection rates has grown over time); Lew Sichel man, Homeownership Gap Widens as Racial
Lending Disparities Worsen, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct 13, 2002, at Jl (claiming that despite
efforts to put minority home buyers on a more even level, the lending gap between races has
worsened); Novelda Sommers, Blacks' Mortgage Door is Narrow, DAILY PRESS (Hampton
Roads, Va.), Oct. 17,2003, at C7 (discussing disparity in home loan denial rates for blacks and
whites).
163. See MARGERY AUSTIN TuRNER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTIIVfE, METROPOLITAN HOUSING
MARKETS: NATIONAL REsULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 iv-v (2002) (discussing the
discrimination faced by African-American and Hispanic homebuyers), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/41 082l_Phase 1_Report.pdf.
164. See Raines Speech, supra note 121 (discussing how many minority families rely on
high-cost subprime lenders and predatory lenders). See generally A. Mechele Dickerson,
Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (discussing racial disparity in subprime lending).
165. See Michael Laris, Legality of Growth Initiatives Debated; Panel Hears Views on
Property Rights, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 2001, at Loudoun Extra 1 (reporting a debate before the
Loudoun County Planning Commission on property rights, slow-growth policies, and the law).
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policies, especially restrictions on multifamily and manufactured housing
developments and large-lot zoning, likely contribute to the racial
homeownership gap by discoirraging builders from constructing smaller, higher
density communities of townhouses, apartments or single unit homes that
would be affordable to people with moderate or low incomes. 166 Given the
income gap between whites and most minority groups, zoning policies that
discourage smaller, more affordable homes will inevitably depress minority
homeownership rates.
Blacks and Hispanics also appear to have lower home ownership rates
because of the racial wealth gap and their lack of intergenerational wealth
accumulation. 167 Becoming a homeowner requires wealth because homeowners
typically must make a down payment and pay closing costs. 168 Wealth also
helps homeowners "buy down" their mortgage (and reduce monthly payments)
because it enables them to put down a larger down payment or reduce their
interest rates by paying up-front points. Whites are four times more likely than
minorities to receive down payment assistance from their parents, are more
likely to inherit property from parents, and are more likely to inherit property of
greater value. 169 This large racial gap in intergenerational wealth transfer has
retarded minority homeownership rates and will contribute to future racial
wealth and homeownership gaps. 170
166. See STATE OF 1HE NATION's HoUSING, supra note 149, at 28 (discussing the effects of
state and local policies aimed at managing residential growth and preserving open space); see
also SCHOlZ & LEVINE, supra note 137, at 41 (discussing the differences in housing between
whites and blacks).
167. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN 69-84
(2004) (discussing the black-white inheritance gap).
168. Many lenders now make zero down mortgage loans, so low-income homebuyers can
now take out a first and second mortgage to purchase their homes. Though this may initially
increase minority homeownership rates, recent trends suggest that the larger mortgage payments
associated with low (or no) down payment home purchases has caused an increase in default
and foreclosures. Compare STATE OF 1HE NATION's HousiNG, supra note 149, at 18-19
(suggesting that record level foreclosures are due to an increased share of loans extended to
borrowers with weak credit histories) with Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
"HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional/mentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime
Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473,541,552-53 (2000) (arguing that lenders extended
loans to borrowers who could never afford to repay the loans).
169. See SCHOIZ&LEviNE, supra note 137, at 21 (discussing research that shows that42%
of white households but less than 10% of black households get downpayment assistance from
parents); see also STATE OF 1HE NATJON' s HOUSING, supra note 149, at 16-17 (postulating that
the $1.4 trillion housing wealth that will pass to white heirs sharply contrasts with $135 billion
in wealth likely to pass to minority heirs).
170. Moreover, research suggests that the children of homeowners are more likely to own a
home earlier than the children of renters and that earlier ownership leads to a greater increase in
housing wealth accumulation. THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMANN, JOINT CTR.
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Even when minorities do become homeowners, their homes tend not to
appreciate as rapidly as white-owned homes. The median value of homes
owned by all families in 2001 was $122,000 and the median value for
homes owned by whites was $130,000. 171 In contrast, the median value for
homes owned by nonwhites or Hispanics was $92,000. 172 For a number of
reasons, homes owned by black families simply are not valued as highly in
the real estate market as homes owned by white families. One reason for
this may be that blacks lack access to the same type of housing stock as
whites, which has caused them to live in smaller homes in more segregated
urban areas where housing appreciation historically has underperformed
suburban housing appreciation. 173 In addition, racial steering and the
reluctance of some whites to live near minorities often prevents minorities
from living in integrated, suburban neighborhoods and the relatively more
expensive homes in those neighborhoods. 174 Thus, while the median home
value in the United States in 2003 was $119,600, the median home value
for blacks ($80,600) was one-third lower than the national median and
significantly lagged home value for Asians ($199,300, which was more
than 50% higher than the national median) and whites ($122,800). 175
Hispanic median home value ($105,600) was lower than white or Asian
home values, but higher than black or Native-American ($81,000) home
value. 176 Because a home's market value affects the home's resale value
and most minority wealth consists of home equity, lower median home

FOR HOUS. STUDIES OFHARV. UNIV., HOUSING AND WFAL1HACCUMULATION: IN1ERGENERATIONAL

IMPACJ'S 15 (2001).
171. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 122, at 19.
172. ld.
173. See DUDA & BELSKY, supra note 157, at 6 (discussing a study that explored the
0

reasons for gaps in minority and white homeownership and partially attributed this gap to the
treatment of minorities by housing market agents); see also ScHOLTZ&LEviNE, supra note 137,
at 41 (suggesting that subtle forms of discrimination may restrict the sizes, locations, and types
of houses available to black homeowners). See generally Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and
Suburbia: The Modem Black Suburb as a "Race-Making Situation," 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM

749 (2002).
174. See DUDA & BELSKY, supra note 157, at 6 (suggesting that, even controlling for
income, minorities are more likely to own homes in central cities than whites and that even
whites who are "wealth-constrained" are more likely to own homes in the suburbs than are
minorities who are not wealth-constrained). See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the
Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
175. ROBERT L. BENNEFIEW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME VALUES: 2000, at 3 (2003).
176. ld.
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values likely will continue to depress black and Hispanic overall wealth
and perpetuate the racial wealth gap. 177

c. Personal. Property
There also is a racial gap in personal property ownerShip. 178 Because
median black and Hispanic household income remains lower than median white
household income, blacks and Hispanics not swprisingly have substantially fewer
personal assets than whites. The percentage of whites who own stocks (24.5%) is
more than double the percentage of nonwhites or Hispanics who own stocks
(11% ). 179 While 21.3% of all families owned stocks in 2001, that rate increases
to more than 60% for the highest income group but less than 12% for the two
lowest income groups in 2001. 180 The racial disparity also persists within the
higher income groups as 61% of the blacks who earn more than $50,000 owned
stocks in 2003, but this rate lags the 79% investment rate of whites in the same
income group. 181 In addition, stocks and mutual fund shares constitute a smaller
percentage of the net worth of black and Hispanic households (4% and 8.3%,
respectively) than white households (16.2%) and total households (15.6% ). 182
Similarly, the value of the stock and mutual fund accounts held by blacks and
Hispanics is considerably less than the value of those owned by whites, blacks
tend to have few interest-bearing bank accounts, and the blacks who receive
"property income" receive mostly interest income-not dividends, rents, royalties,
or income from trusts or estates. 183 Without this gap, recent research suggests
177. See ScHOLlZ & LEVINE, supra note 137, at 41-42 (recognizing a study that found
home equity to be 31-35% of white wealth compared to 53-64% of black wealth); see also
ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIELLI, supra note 139, at 15 (citing a U.S. Census Bureau survey that
indicated homeownership accounted for 31% of total net worth for non-Hispanic whites
compared to 61.8% of total net worth for blacks in 2000).
178. This gap also appears rooted in this country's slavery practices that systematically
denied slaves (and later freed blacks) the opportunity .to accumulate property and then to
bequeath that property to their descendants. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 50. See
generally Raines Speech, supra note 121 (discussing systematic denial of slaves to obtain and
protect their property and to raise capital to create wealth).
179. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 50.
180. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 122, at 13.
181. BLACK INVESTOR SURVEY, supra note 114, at 12.
182. ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIEW, supra note 139, at 15.
183. William A. Darity, Jr. & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Languishing in Inequality: Racial
Disparities in Wealth and Earnings in the New Millennium; in NEW DIRECTIONS 86, 102, 107
(James S. Jackson ed., 2000) [hereinafter Languishing in Inequality]. For example, the median

RACE MATTERS IN BANKRUPTCY

1765

that blacks would have $200 billion more in the stock market and $80 billion
more in bank accounts. 184
The wealth gap in personal property ownership appears particularly
apparent in the retirement savings rate, likely because ownership of taxdeferred retirement accounts increases with income and wealth. 185 Slightly
more than half of all families have some type of retirement account. 186 The
percentage of household net worth that is held in retirement accounts, and the
total amount invested, is significantly higher for whites than blacks, and the
white rate is also higher than the rate for Hispanics. 187 Specifically, while 77%
of white workers have saved for retirement and appear to participate in 401 (k)
plans, Asian Americans have a 73% participation rate, blacks a 59% rate, and
Hispanics only a 50% participation rate. 188 Another study found that, while
52.2% of all families hold retirement accounts, whites hold 56.9% of these
accounts compared to only 37.3% of nonwhites or Hispanics. 189 Studies also
show that workers who lack pension income are largely young, lower income,
nonwhite, female, and single. 190
White workers are more likely to work for employers with pension plans,
and are more likely to participate in those plans, than blacks and Hispanics.
Specifically, while 73% of overall workers are offered a retirement savings
value of 401 K/thrift savings plans owned by blacks in 2000 was $7,500 and for Hispanics was
$9,740, while the median for whites was $79,400. Likewise, the value of stocks and mutual
fund shares for whites ($20,000) is double the value for Hispanics ($10,000) and more than
double the value of stock and mutual funds owned by blacks ($8,000). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AssET OWNERSHIP OF HousEHOLDS: 2000, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/
1998_2000/ wlthOO-l.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
184. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
185. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 122, at 11.
186. /d. at 13; see ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIELLI, supra note 139, at 5 (citing a U.S. Census
Bureau survey that indicated 23.1% of households own an IRA or Keogh account and 29.9%
own a 401K and thrift savings plan).
187. See ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIELLI, supra note 139, at 15 (citing a U.S. Census Bureau
survey that indicated retirement savings accounted for 18.6% of non-Hispanic white total net
worth compared to 9% for blacks and 15.2% for Hispanics); see also BLACK INVESTOR SURVEY,
supra note 114, at 36 (showing the median amount invested in retirement savings accounts is
$36,500 for blacks and $63,700 for whites).
188. THE 2003 MINORITY RETIREMENT CONADENCE SURVEY: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 MINORITY RETIREMENTCONADENCESURVEY), available at http://www.
ebri.org/rcs/2003/03rnrcssf.pdf.
189. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 122, at 13.
190. Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1501, 152627 (2004) ("Those who lacked pension income were more likely ... to be single, female,
Hispanic or not white, or less educated compared to those with pension income.").
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plan by their current employer, the participation rate for blacks (58%) and
native-born Hispanics (65%) lags the overall rate, though this disparity largely
disappears for black workers if income is held constant. 191 Another study found
that only 36% of black and 41% of native-born Hispanic workers have an
employer that contributes money to their retirement savings account, in contrast
to the 49% contribution rate for all workers. 192 Hispanic workers who earn less
than $35,000 are less likely than overall workers to have an employer
contribute to a retirement account for them and less likely to work for an
employer who offers a retirement savings plan. 193 One reason blacks and
Hispanics may lag in retirement savings is because they have relatively higher
unemployment and underemployment rates, often work for smaller employers
who do not sponsor retirement plans, or work part-time and are excluded from
coverage by their employers because of their part-time status. 194
There also appears to be a disparity in retirement savings outside ofwork.
While whites and blacks with comparable incomes have approximately the
same savings rate, 195 high income households generally have higher savings
rates than lower income households. 196 Overall, 57% of households have taxqualified retirement savings plans outside of work in contrast to black (43%) or
Hispanic (39%) households, and retirement savings constitute a much larger
percentage of white household net worth than the net worth of either blacks or
Hispanics. 197 In short, recent data prepared by Fannie Mae indicate that if the
191. 2003 MINORITY RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY, supra note 188, at 3. Again, the
rate for non-native-born Hispanic workers is lower at 49%. /d. at 6; see also CONLEY, supra
note 136, at 29 (noting that higher educated blacks save at a higher rate); Brown, supra note
190, at 1528-30 (discussing the association between race, ethnicity, and a lack of pension
coverage).
192. The savings rate for non-native-born Hispanic workers (22%) is even lower. 2003
MINORITY RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY, supra note 188, at 6.
193. Lower income workers generally have lower participation rates because they cannot
afford to make the matching contributions some employers require. Brown, supra note 190, at
1528-29.
194. 2003 MINORITY RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY 3, supra note 188, at 6; see also
CONLEY, supra note 136, at 99 (discussing statistics that show that black workers who do have
jobs are likely to be given fewer hours than white workers); Brown, supra note 190, at 1524-30
(discussing the eligibility restrictions that many employers place on their pension plans).
195. CONLEY, supra note 136, at 29 ("[A] look at data over a five-year period (1984-89)
does not indicate that blacks save a lower percentage of income than their white counterparts.").
196. /d. at 31 ("Historically, low wages have meant a low savings rate in both absolute and
percentage terms.").
197. 0UVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 106; ORZECHOWSKI & SEPIEU1, supra note 139,
at 6; 2003 MINORITY RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY, supra note 188, at 6. While highincome blacks and whites have comparable retirement savings in most categories, whites appear
to have more money in individual retirement accounts than blacks. BLACK INVESTOR SURVEY,

RACE MAITERS IN BANKRUPTCY

1767

retirement gap could be closed for blacks, blacks potentially would have $120
billion more in retirement funds. 198
d. Unincorporated Businesses
Because self-employment correlates positively with wealth, 1t 1s not
surprising that blacks are less likely to own businesses than whites and more
likely to be wage earners. 199 And even when blacks do own businesses, those
businesses tend to be sole proprietorships that largely provide products and
services for a local black clientele. 200 Black-owned businesses account for just
4% of all U.S. businesses (though the U.S. black population is more than 12%)
and one report suggests that if the combined revenues for the 100 largest blackowned businesses were combined and then assigned to one business, that
business would still not rank as one of the top seventy-five businesses on the
Fortune 500 list. 201 The business ownership gap is attributable to a number
of factors, including the historical effects of slavery, racially discriminatory

supra note 114, at 34.
198. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
199. ScHOlZ & LEVINE, supra note 137, at 42. ln 1997, 83% of total businesses were
owned by whites, compared to 4% black, 6% Hispanic, and 4% Asian. The numbers are
comparable for individual proprietorships. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TilE
UNITED STATES 2002, at 484 (2002) (calculating wage earner by finding the difference between
the number employed and the number owning firms), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/02statab/business.pdf.
200. HACKER, supra note 2, at 126; Gwen Shaffer, In Depth: Minority Business, PHILA.
Bus. J. May 30, 2003, at http://philadelphia.bizjoumals.com/philadelphia/stories/2003/
06/02/focus4.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Wiggins, supra note 173, at 785. Minority businesses also accounted for significantly
less of the sales and receipts than white businesses. ln 1997, white business accounted for 42%
of the total sales and receipts, compared to black businesses accounting for 0.38% of sales and
. receipts, Hispanics accounting for 1%, and Asian businesses accounting for 2% of total sales
and receipts. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES:
ASIAN AND PACIFlC ISLANDERS 1997, at 9 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/ec97/e97cs-5.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES: BLACK 1997, at 9 (200 1), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/e97cs-3.
pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: HISPANIC
1997, at 9 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/e97cs-4.pdf; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, SURVEYOFMINORITY-0WNEDBUSINESSENTERPR1SES: SUMMARY 1997, at 115 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prodlec97/e97cs-7 .pdf.
201. Shaffer, supra note 200; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 EcONOMIC CENSUS MINORITYAND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES UNITED STATES, at http://www.census.gov/epcd/mwb97/us/
us.html (last modified July 12, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Wiggins, supra note 173, at 785 (discussing intercommunity wealth disparity).
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practices that prevented minorities from owning property, and a relatively higher
loan denial rate for black-owned businesses due to inaccurate or unfair asset
appraisals. Because potential black and Hispanic business owners tend to have
less wealth and, thus, less access to credit markets, they have fewer assets to
pledge as collateral for a bank loan. 202 But for this ownership gap, blacks most
likely would own more than 600,000 more businesses with $2.7 trillion more in
revenues. 203

5. Education
Education, especially post-secondary education, serves as a buffer to job loss
and also increases the likelihood of finding a high-income job that provides
benefits. 204 Like the marriage, unemployment, income, and wealth rates,
however, there is a gap between white and minority educational attainment rates.
In 2000, the overall high school completion rate nationally for people 25 and
older was 80% whereas the completion rates for blacks was 72% (up from 20% in
1960) and for Hispanics was 52% (up from 32% in 1970)?05 While the
education gap between whites and blacks is closing, the gap between whites and
Hispanics is still significant and may grow if the Hispanic population increases
because of migration from non-English speaking countries. 206 Moreover,
202. See SCHOLZ& LEVINE, supra note 137, at 41 (suggesting that if credit is less available
to blacks, they are less likely to become self-employed); Darity & Myers, supra note 183, at 107
(noting that without equity capital-pledgeable assets-blacks and Hispanics cannot acquire
debt capital (loans) and that without debt capital, they cannot get operating capital to run a
business); Wiggins, supra note 173, at 790 (noting that black-owned businesses are often denied
loans based on inaccurate or unfair asset appraisals).
203. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
204. In 2002, 28% of individuals without a high school diploma were without health
insurance as compared to the 8% without coverage who had a bachelor's degree or higher.
BHANDARI & MILLS, supr(l note 123, at 2. Because medical expenses increasingly contribute to
a debtor's likelihood of filing for bankruptcy, higher minority unemployment and undereducation rates likely contribute to the proportionately higher numbers of blacks who are filing
for bankruptcy. See Warren, supra note 148, at 1779 ("Medical problems are next on the list,
accounting for about half of all [bankruptcy] filings."). See generally WARREN & TY AGI, supra
note 36, at 88-92 (discussing uninsured medical expenses as contributing to bankruptcy filings).
205. KURT J. BAUMAN & NIKKI L. GRAF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONALATTAINMENT:
2000, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf. The rate
for Asians was identical to the national rate of 80.4%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT, BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1960-1998 (1999) [hereinafter EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT: 2000], available at http://www. census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec04.pdf.
206. There are significant differences in high school completion rates within the Hispanic
subgroups. The 2002 Census data gives the completion rates for Mexican Americans as 50.6%,
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though the overall gap between whites and blacks is closing, one study has
projected that it will not completely close until2013-almost six decades after
the Supreme Court ordered the end to separate and unequal school systems in

Brown v. Board of Education. 207
Despite a steady increase in the number of minorities earning college degrees,
there remains a racial gap. Indeed, the post-secondary attendance rates vary greatly
by race for young adults age 18 to 24. Nationally, 34% of that age group attend
college compared to 56% for Asians, 38% for whites, 27% for blacks, 21% for
Native Americans, and 14% for Hispanics. 208 Another difference is the racial
distribution by enrollment level. Black and Hispanic students are much more likely
to be enrolled in vocational, technical, or business schools than white or Asian
students, and are less likely to be enrolled in graduate schools. 209 Post-secondary
completion rates also differ by race. Asians are much more likely to have a bachelor's
degree (40%) than whites (26%), blacks (14%), Native Americans (11%), or
Hispanics (10%). 210 Overall in 2003, 27.2% of individuals 25 and older had
completed 4 or more years of college and 28.4% of individuals between the age of25
and 29 hold a bachelor's degree or higher.Z 11 The college completion rate for whites
25 or older was 30.0%, and for the 25 to 29 age group was 34.2%.212 In contrast, for
for Puerto Ricans as 66.8% and Cuban Americans as 70.8%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION 25 YEARS AND OLDER, BY SEX AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN TYPE: MARCH 2002 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
hispanic/ppl-165/tab07-2.pdf. Closing the gap will be especially difficult given the
intergenerational transmission of education; for example, the higher the educational attainment of
parents, the more likely that their children will be better educated. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., FAMILY
TIEs: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF PARTICIPATION 9-10 (Russell
Sage Found., Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.russellsage.org/prograrns/proj_
reviews/si/wpschloz manverbaO !.pdf.
207. THE STATE OF THE DREAM, supra note 117, at 17; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). Moreover, the overall gap somewhat masks the still substantial gap involving
student~lwho attend high poverty, racially segregated schools. Students who attend those
schools have a graduation rate that is 15-18% behind the overall graduation rate. Raines
Speech, supra note 121.
208. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & AMIE JAMIESON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT: 2000, at 9 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr26.pdf.
209. SCOTT BOGGESS & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FINANCING THE FUTUREPOSTSECONDARY STUDENTS, COSTS, AND FINANCIAL AID: 1996-1997, at 4 (2002) [hereinafter
FINANCING THE FUTURE], available at http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70s/p70-83.pdf.
210. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT: 2000, supra note 205, at 5.
211. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT,
TBL. A-2, PERCENT OF PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND OVER WHO HAVE COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR
COLLEGE, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940-2003 (2004 ), available
at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf.
212. /d.
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black individuals age 25 and over, the college completion rate was 17.4% and
was 17.5% (almost half the white rate) for those between the ages of 25 and
29. 213 Likewise, for Hispanics over the age of 25, 11.4% had completed 4 or
more years of college as had 10.0% of the 25 to 29 yearolds. 214 Indeed, recent
data indicate that, if America had reached racial equity in education, blacks
would have more than two million more high school and college degrees. 215
Given the lack of intergenerational wealth and disproportionately lower
incomes, blacks and Hispanics who attend college tend to borrow more to pay
for their college education due to skyrocketing college costs, cuts to federal
grants, and fewer race-based scholarships because of attacks from conservative
political groups. 216 Likewise, a higher percentage of minorities attend trade
schools and, until crackdowns and increased enforcement efforts in the 1990s,
many of these proprietary schools provided few marketable skills and some
gave little meaningful educational benefits. 217 Because the typical black college
student is more likely to come from a lower income household and low-income
students are statistically more likely to default on student loans than other
students, blacks also appear to have higher student loan default rates. 218 Blacks
who attend college tend to receive less money from their parents to pay
for their education. Because of this, they find it increasingly difficult to
increase their wealth by saving for (then buying) a house even after

213. /d.
214. /d. There also is a somewhat surprising gender disparity. Among whites,
proportionally more men than women earned college degrees-31. 7% of white men compared
with 27.3% of white women. /d. Among blacks and Hispanics the reverse is true: 17.7% of
black women and 11.2% of Hispanic women age 25 or over but only 16.5% of black men and
11.0% of Hispanic men of the same age had completed four or more years of college by March
2002. /d.
215. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
216. See THOMAS J. KANE, COLLEGE-GoiNG AND INEQUALITY: A LITERATURE REVtEW
(Russell Sage Found., 2001) (discussing the role of rising tuition costs in widening the
enrollment gaps by family income), available at https://securel.sc.netnation.com/-russells/
prograrns/proj_reviews/silrevkaneOl.pdf; Barry Klein, UF Ends Race-Based Scholarship
Programs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 31,2001, at 1A (describing the UniversityofFlorida's
decline in black student enrollment following implementation of the Florida governor's plan to
admit freshman without the use of racial preferences); see also Lyle Denniston & David
Folkenflik, UM Ends Suit Over Aid Based on Race, BALT. SUN, Dec. 19, 1995, at 1B
(discussing a student's successful lawsuit against the school's race-based scholarship program).
217. See Michele Collison, Proprietary Preference For-Profit Colleges Gain Momentum in
Producing Graduates of Color, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER Eouc., July 9, 1998 (discussing the
increasing popularity of attending proprietary schools, especially among minorities), available
at http://www.phdproject.com/phd13.htrnl (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
218. Bob Dart, Loan Defaults Threaten 14 Black Colleges' Aid, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., July
9, 1999, at 3A.
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they graduate from college and get high-income jobs because they need to use
their income to repay student loans. 219

N. A Race Conscious Model To Reform the Code
A. Benefits Gap
The Code generally favors employed debtors with wealth over
unemployed debtors or those with income. Given the racial employment and
wealth gaps, the Code systematically favors white debtors. Likewise, given the
racial homeownership and marriage gaps, whites are more likely to benefit from
the Code's provisions that favor homeowners (including homestead
exemptions), provisions that benefit married debtors who own tenancy by the
entirety property, and provisions that permit married debtors to save expenses
by filing a joint petition. 220 Likewise, because blacks are more likely to provide
financial support to family members who are not their legal dependents or to
support "fictive kin," they are more likely to have dependents with whom they
have no legal or familiar relationship. Black and Hispanic debtors may,
however, benefit from the alimony and child support gaps if the racial balance
in the percentage of people required to pay support is similar to the percentage
of people who are ordered to receive aid. Because fewer blacks and Hispanics
receive alimony and child support, black and Hispanic debtors would be less
likely to have nondischargeable alimony child support debt.

219. Raines Speech, supra note 121.
220. Debtors who live in Texas and Florida, which both have high minority populations,
would benefit from those states generous homestead exemptions. Texas has the second largest
black population, the second highest Hispanic population, and the fourth highest Asian and
American-Indian populations. Florida has the third largest black population, the fourth highest
Hispanic population, the eighth highest Asian population, and the eleventh highest AmericanIndian population. Nicholas A. Jones & James S. Jackson, The Demographic Profile ofAfrican
Americans, 1970-2000, THE BLACK COLLEGIAN, Apr. 1, 2001, at 74. See generally JESSICA S.
BARNES & CLAUDETIE E. BENNETI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE ASIAN POPULATION: 2000, at 4
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-16.pdf; STELLA U.
0GUNWOLE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION:
2000, at 4 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-15.pdf; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, HISPANICS IN mE U.S., 2000, 2001, at http://www.census.gov/mso/www/
· pres_liblhisorig/tsldOOl.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Of course, living in a state with an unlimited homestead exemption is of little use
if you cannot afford to buy a home or you are discouraged from becoming, or hampered in your
efforts to become, a homeowner.
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B. Proposal
Though bankruptcy laws should not be used to remedy all forms of racial
discrimination, they also should not operate to consistently provide greater
benefits to any one demographic group. Thus, in determining how to interpret
bankruptcy laws and how (or whether) to revise those laws, decisionmakers
should use a race-conscious approach that helps close the racial benefits gap. It
is highly unlikely that the members of Congress who enacted the Bankruptcy
Code were overly bigoted or intended to discriminate against minorities.
Likewise, there is no reason to believe courts that interpret ambiguous
provisions of the Code-·for example, how "dependent" should be defined,
when a petition should be dismissed for "substantial abuse," or what types of
expenses are "reasonably necessary"-intend to discriminate against racial
minorities. Though Congress no doubt believed that it was enacting facially
neutral bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy judges likely believe they are applying
facially neutral criteria when interpreting those laws, by acting based on
unspoken beliefs and assumptions, both Congress and the courts grant
bankruptcy relief based on unrecognized white norms.
That decisionmakers do not explicitly intend to discriminate against
minorities largely is irrelevant to minorities if the laws have the effect of
favoring whites or if racial groups perceive that the laws are biased. Racial
minorities who conclude that bankruptcy relief either is biased in favor of
whites or who believe that filing for bankruptcy would give them nominal
benefits will be less likely to use bankruptcy laws to help them resolve their
financial difficulties. Worthy potential minority debtors who refuse to seek the
financial relief provided by a discharge will be harmed as will their existing and
potential creditors. If minorities avoid filing for bankruptcy, they will be forced
to find other ways to resolve their financial crises, including hiding from
creditors, adopting aliases, or simply refusing to pay their debts. If they are
driven from the mainstream credit industry, they will then be forced to rely
even more heavily on "fringe" banking services including rent-to-own
businesses, payday or cash advance loans, and check cashing services. 221
Creditors will be harmed both because debtors will refuse to pay their bills and
221. Minorities are disproportionately less likely to have checking, savings, and money
market accounts. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 122, at 9. For a discussion and explanation of the
potential harm caused by these fringe banking practices, see generally Creola Johnson, Payday
Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002); Creola Johnson,
Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
1221 (discussing the rent-to-own business); Mary Kane, From Pawnshops to "Financial
Supermarkets" Fringe Banking Gains a Foodhold in the Mainstream, S. EXPOSURE, Summer
2003, at 54-59.
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also because debtors will be unable to quickly return to mainstream credit
markets and borrow more from those (or other) lenders in the future.
The existing benefits gaps in the Code largely could be eliminated by a
few legislative amendments and by courts' willingness to adopt a more pluralist
view when interpreting the Code. For example, to help close the gap overall,
debtors who lack the funds (or cannot borrow money from friends or relatives)
should be allowed to file in forma pauperis, and districts that require electronic
filings should continue to provide an exemption for pro se filers. Likewise,
Chapter 13 debtors should be allowed to pay their attorneys over time through
the plan (even if they intend to discharge most debts) just as they can cure
home or car debt in the Chapter 13 plan, keep those assets, yet repay few, if
any, nondischargeable debts.
To level the playing field for renters, Congress should either eliminate,
cap, or regionally index the homestead exemption. Doing so would prevent the
Code from favoring homeowner debtors, especially those who live in highexemption states. Likewise, Congress should permit Chapter 13 renters to cure
lease arrearages over the course of their Chapter 13 plan just as Chapter 13
homeowners can cure mortgage arrearages. Also, Chapter 13 renters should be
allowed to assume a lease even if they default prepetition and do not cure the
default before they start plan payments as long as they give the landlord
adequate assurances that they will cure the default within a reasonable time
period after they commence plan payments.
To close the benefit gap between married and unmarried homeowner
debtors, the Code should allow both married and unmarried debtors who live in
states that recognize tenancy by the entirety to exempt real property as long as
the debtors are married, in a domestic partnership or civil union, or in a longterm relationship and the debtors prove that they need the property to provide a
home for their family. This change initially may provide disproportionately
more benefits to unmarried black debtors. However, given the decrease in the
number of white and Hispanic unmarried couple households and the likely
increase in the number of same-sex households, debtors who live in households
with adults who are not their spouses (or with children who may not be their
biological offspring) may soon become the norm. Likewise, to recognize
differences in family structures, unmarried couples should be allowed to file a
joint petition as long as their financial lives are intertwined. 222
Courts also should define dependent broadly and not limit it to people
with whom the debtor has either a legal or familial relationship. Just as

222.

Dickerson, supra note 49, at 93.
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Congress allows debtors to give (or propose to give) money to charitable
institutions and still be eligible for relief under Chapter 7, debtors should be
allowed to give money, or otherwise provide support, to their nonlegal
dependents and still discharge their debts in Chapter 7. Debtors also should be
allowed to exempt monetary payments that are necessary to support their
nonlegal dependents who are in fact dependent on them. Similarly, courts
should confirm a Chapter 13 plan that excludes from disposable income funds
that the debtor uses to support nonlegal dependents, just as debtors currently
are allowed to exclude funds they give to a charitable institution. 223
To help decrease the wealth gap and the appearance that the Code favors
the ultra-wealthy, Congress should include spendthrift trusts in property of the
estate and should cap the value of retirement savings debtors can exclude. To
eliminate the information asymmetry between debtors who have access to
lawyers who give them exemption planning advice and those who do not, the
Code should allow debtors to contribute a specified amount of nonexempt
funds to an exempt pension fund either prepetition (as part of exemption
planning) or postpetition.
To recognize that the income and wealth gaps likely cause minorities to
incur significantly higher student loan debt, courts should abandon the undue
hardship student loan dischargeability test in favor of a totality of the
circumstances test. They also should consider the quality of the education the
debtor received when deciding whether to discharge the debt and should
continue to grant debtors a partial discharge (assuming they satisfy the totality
of circumstances test). Relaxing the rigid undue hardship test will be especially
beneficial to minority debtors who have attended college because recent
empirical data suggest that they are more likely to file for bankruptcy than
whites who attended college. 224
Finally, given the existing benefits gap, Congress should not "means test"
bankruptcy relief. Doing so would further widen the benefits gap between
debtors with wealth and those with income because high-income debtors who
223. In addition, courts should reconsider whether a fraudulent transfer occurs when
debtors transfer property to their dependents, but receive only intangible, noneconomic benefits
in exchange. See, e.g., Hinsley v. Boudloche (In re Hinsley), 201 F.3d 638,643 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a debtor who transfers property because of a desire to preserve the marriage does
not receive an economic benefit in exchange for the property). Debtors who consistently
provide financial support to indigent family members should not necessarily be deemed to have
committed a fraudulent conveyance unless it is clear that the transfer was designed to defraud
creditors or hinder creditor collection attempts.
224. Warren, supra note 148, at 1782 ("These data reveal a deeply vulnerable middle class
in which African Americans who have gone to school and worked like whites are nonetheless
more than three times more likely to find themselves in bankruptcy.").
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would be deemed to have the ability to repay their debts in Chapter 13 would
be denied a quicker Chapter 7 discharge, and thus would be prevented from
discharging their debts and retaining their (potentially meager) wealth. In
contrast, high-wealth but low-income Chapter 7 debtors likely would not be
forced to liquidate their wealth to fund a Chapter 13 plan. For similar reasons,
Congress should reject proposals to make it harder to discharge credit card
debt. Since blacks and Hispanics have lower incomes and significantly fewer
assets than whites, they appear to rely more on credit card debt than whites. 225
Similarly, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (who have higher median incomes
than whites) all appear to pay more than the national average toward their
monthly credit card bills and also have higher credit card debt than the national
average. 226 Given the racial wealth and income gaps and the fact that those gaps
appear to cause minorities to rely more heavily on credit cards, making it harder
to discharge credit card debt will have a disproportionately negative effect on
minorities.

V. Conclusion
Despite the sheer volume of people who are affected by federal
bankruptcy laws, neither bankruptcy nor critical race scholars have
considered whether federal bankruptcy laws are raced. 227 On the surface,
bankruptcy laws appear race neutral. And, even if courts were to consider
the race of the debtor, it is unlikely that the outcome of many bankruptcy
cases would change. If, however, members of Congress (in considering ways
to reform the Code) or bankruptcy judges (when interpreting ambiguous
phrases in the Code) consciously consider the racial impact of their decisions,
the contours of the benefits the Code provides would be different A race-conscious
Bankruptcy Code would not just benefit minority debtors, however. Instead,
225. TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DEMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET THE
GROWTII OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE '90S, at 23 (2003), available at http://www.demosusa.org/pubs/borrowing_to_make_ ends_meet.pdf.
226. See Charge It: Minorities are Carrying Much More Credit Card Debt, MINORITY
MKTS. ALERT, Sept. 1, 1997, at 1 (noting that credit card debt among black and Hispanic
families is 25.2% and 24.5% above the national average, respectively).
227. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991
Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 965, 966
(1993) (discussing race and facially neutral laws). Bankruptcy may not be viewed as a critical
race issue because it "presents devilishly complex policy issues" and because "its partial debt
forgiveness and partial debt ratification [make it] a difficult concept to grasp, even in its most
basic form." See Warren, supra note 24, at 43-44 (explaining why bankruptcy may not be
viewed as a women's issue).
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as is true in many other areas of law and in life, minorities serve as the miner's
canary for all debtors? 28 If Congress and the courts commit to using the Code
to achieve substantive racial justice, then bankruptcy laws will better provide
fairer and more just benefits to financially strapped Americans of all races.

228. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY:
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).
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